| Kolbe v Tibbetts |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 08899 [101 AD3d 1623] |
| December 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Herbert Kolbe et al., Respondents, v Christine J. Tibbetts,as Superintendent of Schools of Newfane Central School District, et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Reden & O'Donnell, LLP, Buffalo (Terry M. Sugrue of counsel), forplaintiffs-respondents.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated judgment and order) of the Supreme Court, NiagaraCounty (Catherine R. Nugent Panepinto, J.), entered October 18, 2011. The judgment, inter alia,granted the motion of plaintiffs for summary judgment and denied the cross motion of defendantsfor summary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is reversed on the law without costs,the motion is denied, the cross motion is granted, the third through sixth decretal paragraphs arevacated, and judgment is granted in favor of defendants as follows:
It is adjudged and declared that defendants are not obligated to maintain health insurance coverage equivalent to thatin effect at the time each plaintiff retired.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs, retirees of defendant Newfane Central School District (District),commenced this breach of contract/declaratory judgment action seeking, inter alia, a declarationthat their rights with respect to health insurance benefits are governed by each collectivebargaining agreement (CBA) that was in effect at the time each plaintiff retired. Supreme Courtgranted plaintiffs' motion seeking summary judgment and denied defendants' cross motion forsummary judgment.
Each CBA in effect at the time of plaintiffs' respective retirements set forth a nominal copayfor prescriptions in accordance with the health care plan that was in effect at that time. InDecember 2009, each plaintiff was notified that, pursuant to the CBA effective January 1, 2010,the copay for prescriptions would be significantly increased. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint[*2]that they are not obligated to pay the higher rate but, rather,are obligated to pay only the rate that was in effect at the time of their respective retirements.
The language at issue is contained in section 6.5. of each CBA, and that section is entitled"Retirement Benefits." In each CBA, section 6.5.3 provides in relevant partthat full-time employees who retire from the District under the New York State Employees'Retirement System may receive credit for group health insurance premiums based onaccumulated sick leave. In the CBAs in effect from 1990 through 1994 and 1994 through 1996,the language at issue states that "[t]he coverage provided shall be the coverage which is in effectfor the unit at such time as it is provided to the employee." In the subsequent CBAs, the languageat issue states that "[t]he coverage provided shall be the coverage which is in effect for the unit atsuch time as the employee retires." Section 6.4 in each of the CBAs provides that retiredemployees shall be eligible to "continue group health insurance" upon the payment of a monthlypremium to the District. Section 6.4 also sets forth the health plans available to the employeescovered by the respective CBAs.
We agree with defendants that the court erred in determining that the unequivocal languageof the respective CBAs required that the prescription copay amount set forth in section 6.4 couldnot be altered based upon the language in section 6.5.3, providing that unused sick leave could beused to pay for health care coverage. The unambiguous language in section 6.5.3 provides that, atthe time of his or her retirement, the retiree is entitled to the same coverage that is provided to thebargaining unit. The language does not specify that an equivalent level of coverage will continueduring retirement (cf. Williams vVillage of Endicott, 91 AD3d 1160, 1161 [2012]; Della Rocco v City ofSchenectady, 252 AD2d 82, 84 [1998], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 1000 [1999]; see generally Hudock v Village ofEndicott, 28 AD3d 923, 923 [2006]). In Williams (91 AD3d at 1161), the CBAprovided that the defendant " 'shall keep in full force and effect medical coverage and hospitalcoverage for each member of the bargaining unit, with benefits to be of a value at leastequivalent to those presently in force' " (emphasis added). In Della Rocco (252 AD2dat 84), the CBA provided that the defendant "would provide insurance coverage 'equivalent tothe plan presently in effect for each member of the Department and his [or her] family, andfor retired members and their families' " (emphasis added). In Hudock (28 AD3d at 923),the CBA provided that the annual cost toward the premium would remain the same. Here, therespective CBAs do not provide that the level of health coverage will not be reduced or that theannual cost will not increase.
Inasmuch as the benefits for represented employees were likewise reduced, defendants havecomplied with the statutory requirement that they not reduce plaintiffs' coverage below the levelof coverage provided to active employees (see L 1994, ch 729, as extended by L 2009, ch30). In light of our determination, we need not address defendants' remaining contentions.
All concur except Lindley and Whalen, JJ., who dissent and vote to modify in accordancewith the following memorandum.
Lindley and Whalen, JJ. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. We disagree with themajority's determination that the language in section 6.5.3 of each collective bargainingagreement (CBA) is unambiguous. The relevant language of that section provides that full-timeemployees who retire from defendant Newfane Central School District (District) under the NewYork State Employees' Retirement System plan shall be entitled to credit toward group healthinsurance premiums for accumulated sick leave. That section further provides that, in the eventof the retiree's death, the benefit shall transfer to the surviving spouse. As noted by the majority,one version of the CBA states that "[t]he coverage provided shall be the coverage which is ineffect for the unit at such time as it is provided to the employee," while the other version statesthat "[t]he coverage provided shall be the coverage which is in effect for the unit at such time asthe employee retires." The language in section 6.5.3 regarding the level of coverage for retirees[*3]conflicts with language found in section 6.4 of the CBA.Section 6.4 provides that retired employees shall be eligible to "continue group health insurance"upon payment of a monthly premium to the District. In section 6.5.3, the word "benefit" is usedto describe the sick-leave accrual and the word "coverage" is used to describe the particular plan,or health insurance. The words "benefit" and "coverage" may have been included in the sameparagraph in order to distinguish between the two words and to establish different rights forretirees. Section 6.5.3 may have given retirees additional rights to health insurance coverage inaddition to those provided in section 6.4. " 'A contract is ambiguous if the language used lacks adefinite and precise meaning, and there is a reasonable basis for a difference of opinion' " (Williams v Village of Endicott, 91AD3d 1160, 1162 [2012]). Given the conflict between section 6.5.3 and section 6.4, webelieve that an ambiguity exists. We have held that, "[i]n the event that a contract is ambiguous,its interpretation is still a matter for the court unless 'determination of the intent of the partiesdepends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to bedrawn from extrinsic evidence' " (Destiny USA Holdings, LLC v Citigroup Global Mkts. Realty Corp., 69AD3d 212, 218 [2009], quoting Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v Wesolowski, 33NY2d 169, 172 [1973]). The parties submitted conflicting evidence regarding the intendedmeaning of the provisions at issue here, and a determination as to such intended meaning cannotbe made absent additional extrinsic evidence. We therefore conclude that the matter should beremitted to Supreme Court for a hearing at which parol evidence may be presented to establishthe parties' intent. Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra, Lindley and Whalen, JJ.