| People v Brown |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 08902 [101 AD3d 1627] |
| December 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Lasean J. Brown, Appellant. |
—[*1] Scott D. McNamara, District Attorney, Utica (Matthew P. Worth of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Michael L. Dwyer, J.), renderedFebruary 23, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal sale of acontrolled substance in the third degree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of twocounts each of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law§ 220.16 [1]) and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (§220.39 [1]). Inasmuch as the confidential informant involved in the drug transactions giving riseto defendant's conviction was identified and testified at trial, defendant's contention that CountyCourt erred in denying that part of his pretrial omnibus motion seeking disclosure of the identityof the informant is academic (see People v Ingram, 217 AD2d 986, 987 [1995]; seegenerally People v Goggins, 34 NY2d 163, 168-169 [1974], cert denied 419 US 1012[1974]). We reject defendant's further contention that the court erred in denying that part of hisomnibus motion seeking a Darden hearing. Because the informant testified before thegrand jury and at trial, the objectives of a Darden hearing, i.e., confirmation that theinformant existed and provided information to the police concerning the drug sales at issue, weremet (see People v Kimes, 37 AD3d1, 15-16 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 881 [2007], reconsideration denied 9NY3d 846 [2007]; see generally Peoplev Wilson, 48 AD3d 1099, 1100 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 845 [2008]).
We reject defendant's contention that the court's denial of his challenge for cause to one ofthe prospective jurors requires reversal (see CPL 270.20 [2]). Defendant did not use aperemptory challenge as to the prospective juror at issue and did not exhaust all of hisperemptory challenges before the completion of jury selection. Thus, the court's denial ofdefendant's challenge is not a basis for reversal (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People vFlocker, 223 AD2d 451, 452 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 847 [1996]). We note in anyevent that the prospective juror at issue was not in fact seated as a juror. Finally, under thecircumstances of this case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denyingdefendant's request, made on the morning that the trial was scheduled to commence, for anadjournment to permit his new attorney to prepare his defense (see People v Povio, 284AD2d 1011, 1011 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 923 [2001]). "[T]he [*2]right to counsel does not include the right to delay" (People vArroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 273 [1980] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it does not warrantreversal or modification of the judgment. Present—Smith, J.P., Carni, Lindley, Sconiersand Whalen, JJ.