| Smilowitz v GCA Serv. Group, Inc. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 09044 [101 AD3d 1101] |
| December 26, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Eugenia Smilowitz, Appellant, v GCA Service Group, Inc.,Respondent. |
—[*1] Andrea G. Sawyers, Melville, N.Y. (Dominic P. Zafonte of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Taylor, J.), dated July 6, 2011, which granted thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff alleged that she slipped and fell on snow and ice as she was entering her placeof employment in St. John Hall, on the campus of St. John's University. The defendant was undercontract with the University to maintain the grounds, which included snow removal work. TheSupreme Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Under the "storm in progress rule," neither a landlord nor a snow removal contractor will beheld liable for injuries sustained as a result of slippery conditions that occur during an ongoingstorm, or for a reasonable time thereafter (Weller v Paul, 91 AD3d 945, 947 [2012] [internal quotation marksomitted]; see Coyne v TalleyrandPartners, L.P., 22 AD3d 627 [2005]). Here, the defendant established its prima facieentitlement to judgment as a matter of law by producing evidence that the accident occurredwhile a snow storm either was in progress or had just stopped (see Coyne v Talleyrand Partners, L.P.,22 AD3d 627 [2005]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Theplaintiff tendered no evidence that the defendant either created or exacerbated the alleged icycondition that she slipped on (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136,142-143 [2002]; Coyne v TalleyrandPartners, L.P., 22 AD3d 627 [2005]). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, thespeculation of the defendant's former employee, who had been employed as a porter for thedefendant, that when round salt mixes with frozen rain "it's a little bit slippery," did not raise atriable issue of fact as to whether the defendant's snow removal efforts created or exacerbated adangerous condition (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d at 142). By merelyundertaking snow removal, as required by contract, the defendant cannot be said "to have createdor exacerbated [*2]a dangerous condition" (id. at 142).Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.P., Hall, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.