| People v Dargan |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 09079 [101 AD3d 1143] |
| December 26, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jimmy Dargan, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Thomas M. Rossof counsel; Julie C. Ruggieri on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garnett, J.),rendered November 24, 2009, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support hisconviction is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484,491-492 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to theprosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legallysufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling ourresponsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to viewthe witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt wasnot against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, certain communications made by court officers tojurors were purely ministerial in nature, and did not improperly convey legal instructions to thejurors (see People v Nacey, 78 NY2d 990, 991 [1991]; People v Bonaparte, 78NY2d 26, 30 [1991]; People v Lebron, 184 AD2d 784, 788 [1992]; People vBelgrave, 181 AD2d 738 [1992]; People v Hodges, 173 AD2d 644 [1991]; cf. People v Cassell, 62 AD3d1021, 1021-1022 [2009]; People v Lara, 199 AD2d 419, 419-420 [1993]), orotherwise violate CPL 310.10 (see People v Manzo, 233 AD2d 529, 530 [1996]). Inaddition, since the court officers' communications related to administrative matters so as to fallwithin their supervisory role, the defendant's absence during such communications did notconstitute a violation of his right to be present (see People v Manzo, 233 AD2d at 530;People v Buxton, 192 AD2d 289, 293 [1993]).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's request tomake additional inquiries of a juror who, inter alia, quarreled with another juror during [*2]the course of deliberations (see People v Maragh, 94 NY2d569, 573-574 [2000]; People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 297-299 [1987]; cf. People v Wright, 35 AD3d 172[2006]). The Supreme Court conducted a sufficiently probative inquiry of the juror in question,and ascertained that the juror could continue to deliberate in a fair and impartial manner (seePeople v Maragh, 94 NY2d at 573-574; People v Buford, 69 NY2d at 297-299).
The defendant argues that Supreme Court should not have classified his prior conviction as aviolent felony offense because the accusatory instrument used in that proceeding was a superiorcourt information—and not an indictment—and, as such, his plea of guilty to thelesser grade offense cannot qualify as a violent felony. We disagree. A "superior courtinformation has the same force and effect as an indictment and all procedures and provisions oflaw applicable to indictments are also applicable to superior court informations, except whereotherwise expressly provided" (CPL 200.15).
Accordingly, contrary to the defendant's contention, since he had previously pleaded guilty toattempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree under a superior court informationcharging the greater offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, he wasproperly designated a second violent felony offender (see Penal Law § 70.02 [1][d]; CPL 220.20 [1]; 200.15; People vCunningham, 86 AD3d 859, 860 [2011]; People v Henry, 52 AD3d 841, 842-844 [2008]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Mastro, J.P., Rivera, Chambers and Lott, JJ., concur.