| Matter of Elniski v Niagara Falls Coach Lines, Inc. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 09204 [101 AD3d 1722] |
| December 28, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Keliann Elniski, Appellant, v Niagara Falls Coach Lines,Inc., et al., Respondents. (Appeal No. 1.) |
—[*1] Jaeckle Fleischmann & Mugel, LLP, Buffalo (Howard S. Rosenhoch of counsel), forrespondents-respondents Niagara Falls Coach Lines, Inc. and Raeanne Argy-Tyler.
Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John A.Michalek, J.), entered April 20, 2012. The order and judgment, inter alia, determined the value ofpetitioner's shares in respondent Niagara Falls Coach Lines, Inc.
It is hereby ordered that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on thelaw by vacating that part determining the value of petitioner's shares and as modified the order andjudgment is affirmed without costs and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Erie County, for furtherproceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: In appeal No. 1, petitioner appeals froman order and judgment that, inter alia, valued her minority share of the stock in respondent NiagaraFalls Coach Lines, Inc. (NFCL), a subchapter S corporation, at $1.4 million, directed NFCL to paythat sum to petitioner in installments, and ordered petitioner to relinquish her shares to NFCL, free andclear of any encumbrances, upon an initial payment by NFCL in the amount of $500,000.
We reject petitioner's contention that Supreme Court erred in setting the terms and conditions ofthe transfer of her shares. A trial court has discretion in setting the terms and conditions by which theshares of a minority shareholder are transferred in these circumstances, such as by establishing apayment schedule or by requiring that a bond or other acceptable security instrument be posted(see Matter of Cortland MHP Assoc. [Petralia—Burnham], 267 AD2d 1013,1013-1014 [1999]; Matter of Penepent Corp. [appeal No. 11], 198 AD2d 782, 783[1993], lv denied 83 NY2d 797 [1994]; Matter of Seagroatt Floral Co. [Riccardi],167 AD2d 586, 589 [1990], mod on other grounds 78 NY2d 439 [1991]; see alsoBusiness Corporation Law § 1118 [c] [2]). On this record, it cannot be said that the courtabused its discretion in setting the terms and conditions of the instant transfer.
With respect to the court's valuation of petitioner's shares, "[t]he determination of a [*2][factfinder] as to the value of a business, if it is within the range oftestimony presented, will not be disturbed on appeal where valuation of the business rested primarily onthe credibility of expert witnesses and their valuation techniques" (Matter of McKeown [Image Collision, Ltd.], 94 AD3d 1445, 1446[2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Nevertheless, we agree with petitioner that the court erredin accepting the valuation assessment of respondents' expert insofar as it calculated the after-tax valueof the shares (see Burrows v Burrows, 270 AD2d 871, 871 [2000]; Stolow v Stolow,149 AD2d 683, 686 [1989], mot to resettle granted 152 AD2d 559 [1989]; Siegel vSiegel, 132 AD2d 247, 251-252 [1997], appeal dismissed 71 NY2d 1021 [1987], lvdenied 74 NY2d 602 [1989]). We therefore modify the order and judgment in appeal No. 1 byvacating the court's valuation determination, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for furtherproceedings consistent with our decision. In light of our determination, we need not address petitioner'sremaining contentions in appeal No. 1. Finally, we dismiss the appeal from the order in appeal No. 2inasmuch as the issues raised therein have been rendered moot by our determination in appeal No. 1.Present—Smith, J.P., Carni, Lindley, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.