| Felix v Brand Serv. Group LLC |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 09207 [101 AD3d 1724] |
| December 28, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Ronald M. Felix et al., Respondents, v Brand Service Group LLC et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Harris Beach PLLC, Buffalo (Richard T. Sullivan of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John A. Michalek, J.), entered August2, 2011. The order granted the motion of plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs and defendants entered into an asset purchase agreement for the purchaseof an AAMCO franchise by plaintiffs for $675,000. The parties executed a promissory note and anescrow agreement, pursuant to which $250,000 was placed into an escrow account at M&T Bank toensure payment of any outstanding sales tax liability. The New York State Department of Taxation andFinance determined that defendants owed $115,860.84 to the State of New York, which was paidfrom the escrow account, leaving a balance of $134,139.16 in that account.
On March 25, 2011, plaintiffs commenced this action alleging causes of action for rescission of theasset purchase agreement, promissory note and escrow agreement, fraud, unjust enrichment, theimposition of a constructive trust, an accounting, and any allowable injunctive relief. Plaintiffs alsomoved by order to show cause for a preliminary injunction preventing release of the remaining funds inthe escrow account to any party during the pendency of this action. We conclude that Supreme Courtdid not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiffs' motion.
Preliminary injunctions are proper with respect to the release of funds in escrow where it isnecessary to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the litigation (see Bashein vLandau, 96 AD2d 479, 479 [1983]). In order to establish its entitlement to a preliminaryinjunction, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, " '(1)a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits; (2) the prospect of irreparable injury if the provisionalrelief is withheld; and (3) a balance of equities tipping in the moving party's favor' " (Destiny USA Holdings, LLC v Citigroup GlobalMkts. Realty Corp., 69 AD3d 212, 216 [2009], quoting Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d748, 750 [1988]).[*2]
We conclude that plaintiffs met their burden with respect to thefirst prong of the test, i.e., a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, with respect to the rescissionand fraud causes of action. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that defendants misrepresented the amount ofweekly gross receipts of the business, sold fraudulent warranties, underreported income by keepingtwo sets of financial records and provided plaintiffs with an inaccurate 2008 profit and loss statement.
Plaintiffs also met their burden with respect to the second prong of the test, i.e., whether there willbe irreparable injury if the provisional relief is withheld. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that the funds in theescrow account, if dispersed, likely will not be recoverable due to defendants' precarious financialposition. Indeed, they submitted evidence that defendant David Brand has various outstanding debts,including an outstanding tax liability of $115,860.84 to the State of New York, and that he was at riskof bankruptcy if he did not sell the AAMCO franchise.
Finally, we conclude that plaintiffs met their burden with respect to the third prong of the test, i.e.,whether a balance of the equities tips in plaintiffs' favor. Such a balancing involves an inquiry whether"the irreparable injury to be sustained . . . is more burdensome [to the plaintiff] than theharm caused to defendant through imposition of the injunction" (Destiny USA Holdings, LLC,69 AD3d at 223 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the irreparable injury to plaintiffs is moreburdensome than the harm caused to defendants through the imposition of the injunction. Whiledefendants may be delayed in paying off debt or using the escrow money for other purposes, plaintiffsmay never be able to recover the money, if disbursed, even if plaintiffs ultimately prevail in theunderlying action. Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Valentino, Whalen and Martoche, JJ.