| Francis v Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc./Burns Intl. Sec. Servs.Corp. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00178 [102 AD3d 739] |
| January 16, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Wendell Francis, Appellant, v Securitas SecurityServices USA, Inc./Burns International Security Services Corporation,Respondent. |
—[*1] Marin Goodman, LLP, Harrison, N.Y. (Dean L. Jarmel of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appealsfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Graham, J.), dated October 28,2011, which denied his motion, denominated as one to vacate an order of the same courtdated August 19, 2011, which, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendant's motionwhich was pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel certain disclosure, and conditionallydismissed the complaint unless the plaintiff provided the disclosure specified in the orderdated August 19, 2011, within 45 days.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In an order dated August 19, 2011, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branchof the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel certaindisclosure, and directed the plaintiff to provide the subject disclosure within 30 days. Theplaintiff subsequently moved to "vacate" the order dated August 19, 2011, contendingthat the disclosure he had been directed to provide was "sensitive information," whichwas irrelevant and unnecessary to the defense of the action. By order dated October 14,2011, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion, and conditionally dismissed thecomplaint unless the plaintiff provided the disclosure specified in the order dated August19, 2011, within 45 days of its new order.
CPLR 3101 (a) broadly mandates "full disclosure of all matter material and necessaryin the prosecution or defense of an action," and this provision is liberally interpreted infavor of disclosure (see Kavanagh v Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp., 92 NY2d952, 954 [1998]; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968];Ural v Encompass Ins. Co. ofAm., 97 AD3d 562, 566 [2012]). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, theinformation he was directed to provide by the order dated August 19, 2011, which he hadpreviously refused to disclose in response to questioning at his deposition, was materialand relevant to the defense of this action (see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co.,21 NY2d at 406; Elie v City ofNew York, 92 AD3d 716, 718 [2012]; cf. Holness v Chrysler Corp.,220 AD2d 721, 722 [1995]).
Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently[*2]exercised its discretion in conditionally dismissingthe complaint unless the plaintiff provided the disclosure specified in the order datedAugust 19, 2011, within 45 days of the order dated October 14, 2011 (see Roug Kang Wang vChien-Tsang Lin, 94 AD3d 850, 851-852 [2012]; Workman v Town ofSouthampton, 69 AD3d 619, 620 [2010]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. Eng, P.J., Angiolillo, Sgroiand Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.