Latora v Ferreira
2013 NY Slip Op 00309 [102 AD3d 838]
January 23, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 27, 2013


John Latora, Respondent,
v
Victor Ferreira,Appellant.

—[*1]Charles R. Cuneo, Garden City, N.Y., for appellant.

Tarik Davis, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action, inter alia, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of realproperty, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated August 11, 2011, as granted thatbranch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to enter judgment upon a decision ofthe same court (Archer, Ct. Atty. Ref.), dated June 8, 2010, made after a nonjury trial,concluding that the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts,with costs, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to enter judgmentupon the decision dated June 8, 2010, is denied, the cause of action for specificperformance is directed to be dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court,Kings County, for further proceedings on the second and third causes of action.

"Where a case is tried without a jury, the power of the Appellate Division is as broadas that of the trial court, and this Court may render the judgment it finds warranted by thefacts, taking into account that in a close case the trial judge had the advantage of seeingthe witnesses" (Musick v 330Wythe Ave. Assoc., LLC, 41 AD3d 675, 675 [2007]; see NorthernWestchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499[1983]; Decatur [2004] Realty,LLC v Cruz, 73 AD3d 970, 971 [2010]; Daimon v Fridman, 5 AD3d 426, 427 [2004]).

A party seeking specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property isrequired to establish not only that he or she was ready, willing, and able to close on thescheduled closing date, but also that the other party was in default (see Nehmadi v Davis, 63AD3d 1125, 1128 [2009]; Elbayadi v Norton, 216 AD2d 936, 936 [1995];Exclusive Envelope Corp. v Tal-Spons Corp., 187 AD2d 556 [1992]).

A letter from the attorney for the plaintiff buyer to the attorney for the defendantseller, dated May 24, 2005, advised that the buyer was prepared to close "on any date. . . within the next ten days," and that the buyer would make himselfavailable "at any time and location so designated by you," and requested that theseller's attorney "contact me within the next ten days to schedule a closing" (emphasisadded). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the letter was nothing more than a "mere[ ]demand[ ] that the defendant[ ] fix a closing date" (Cave v Kollar, 296 AD2d370, 372 [2002]), and, thus, was inadequate to make time of the essence because "it didnot clearly and [*2]distinctly set a new date and time forclosing, and it did not inform the defendant[ ] that [he] would be considered in default if[he] did not perform by a given date" (id. at 372 [citations omitted]; seeKevan v Modesta, 292 AD2d 348 [2002]; Mazzaferro v Kings Park ButcherShop, 121 AD2d 434, 436 [1986]; cf. Decatur [2004] Realty, LLC v Cruz,73 AD3d at 970; Zelmanovitch v Ramos, 299 AD2d 353, 353 [2002]).Accordingly, "[s]ince there was never a time of the essence closing, nor even a futurescheduled closing date, it cannot be concluded that the [seller] willfully defaulted or wasunable to tender his performance" (Nehmadi v Davis, 63 AD3d at 1128).

Moreover, there is no credible proof that the plaintiff tendered his performance underthe terms of the contract, as his attorney admittedly did not schedule the appearance of atitle company for the purported closing in or about May 2005, and the plaintiff's trialtestimony that he prepared a bank check in an amount necessary to consummate thetransaction was conclusory, self-serving, and unsupported by documentary evidence.

The plaintiff's contention that the defendant anticipatorily repudiated the contract byrefusing to close title does not find support in the record, which indicates that the partiesconducted extensive, albeit unsuccessful, negotiations concerning the amount of anadjustment to be credited to the plaintiff for open violations on the subject premises (cf. Yitzhaki v Sztaberek, 38AD3d 535 [2007]).

Based on the evidence, the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance.Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a judgment directing specificperformance should have been denied, and the cause of action for specific performancemust be dismissed. In addition, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, KingsCounty, for further proceedings on the remaining causes of action. Mastro, J.P., Rivera,Dickerson and Lott, JJ., concur.


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