| Sklover v Sack |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00323 [102 AD3d 855] |
| January 23, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Alan L. Sklover, Respondent, v Jonathan Sack etal., Appellants. |
—[*1] Sklover & Donath, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Alan L. Sklover pro se and Susan R.Nudelman of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for defamation, the defendants appeal from an orderof the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), entered November 10, 2011, whichgranted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability anddismissing their affirmative defenses, and denied their cross motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the affirmative defenses isdenied, and the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaintis granted.
In February 2008, nonparty Daniel Magnus, represented by the plaintiff, commencedan action against his former employer in the United States District Court for the SouthernDistrict of New York (hereinafter the federal action). Shortly thereafter, Magnusdischarged the plaintiff as his attorney and retained the defendant law firm, Sack & Sack,to represent him in the federal action. Shortly after the commencement of the federalaction, the parties thereto reached a settlement.
Prior to the filing of the stipulation of discontinuance in the federal action on July 16,2008, the defendant Jonathan Sack, an attorney at Sack & Sack, sent a letter to theplaintiff accusing him of mishandling Magnus's claims and weakening Magnus'snegotiating position. Sack demanded that the plaintiff return all of the fees that Magnuspaid to the plaintiff, and advised that Magnus would not pay the outstanding balance ofthe fees that were charged. In response, the plaintiff sent letters to Sack and MarjorieKaye, Jr., counsel to Magnus's former employer in the federal action, notifying them thathis firm held a charging lien on the proceeds of the settlement. The plaintiff also sent aletter to Sack, with a copy sent to Kaye, proposing a settlement of his claim for the legalfees secured by the charging lien.
On July 10, 2008, by email addressed to the plaintiff and copied to Sack, Kaye sent aresponse to the plaintiff's letter asserting the charging lien initiating a series of emailcorrespondence among the three attorneys. The correspondence culminated in an emailwritten by Sack in which, among other things, he repeated his allegations that theplaintiff mishandled Magnus's claims. Sack proposed a settlement of Magnus's claim,pursuant to which the plaintiff would agree to a return of the fees previously paid to theplaintiff, in consideration of Sack's [*2]forbearance fromcommencing a legal malpractice action on behalf of Magnus if the plaintiff promptlyreturned the fees. The plaintiff rejected the proposal, and then commenced thisdefamation action against Sack and his law firm, Sack & Sack, alleging that a number ofstatements in Sack's email were libelous per se. Following discovery, the plaintiff movedfor summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmativedefenses, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion and denied the defendants'cross motion.
Even if the offending statements are actionable assertions of fact rather thannonactionable expressions of opinion (see generally Mann v Abel, 10 NY3d 271, 276 [2008],cert denied 555 US 1170 [2009]), the statements are protected by the absoluteprivilege for statements made in a judicial proceeding. A statement made by counsel inthe course of a judicial proceeding, even if made with malice or bad faith, "is absolutelyprivileged if, by any view or under any circumstances, it may be considered pertinent tothe litigation" (Martirano v Frost, 25 NY2d 505, 507 [1969]; see Rabiea v Stein, 69 AD3d700, 700 [2010]; Sexter &Warmflash, P.C. v Margrabe, 38 AD3d 163, 171 [2007]). The statements atissue were made among counsel in a pending judicial proceeding, and were pertinent to adispute over the proceeds of the settlement in the federal action (see Rabiea vStein, 69 AD3d at 701; Sexter & Warmflash, P.C. v Margrabe, 38 AD3d at175-176; Impallomeni v Meiselman, Farber, Packman & Eberz, 272 AD2d 579,580 [2000]; cf. Ingber vMallilo, 52 AD3d 569, 570 [2008]). Furthermore, the statements were pertinentto the settlement of a prospective legal malpractice litigation (see Vodopia vZiff-Davis Publ. Co., 243 AD2d 368 [1997]; Lieberman v Hoffman, 239AD2d 273 [1997]). Accordingly, the statements are protected by an absolute privilege,and the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff's motion and granted thedefendants' cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
In light of our determination, the defendants' remaining contentions have beenrendered academic. Mastro, J.P., Lott, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.