| Matter of Quinn v Heffler |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00341 [102 AD3d 876] |
| January 23, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Raymond Quinn et al.,Respondents, v Michelle P. Heffler, Appellant, et al.,Respondent. |
—[*1] Jeanmarie A. Marquardt, Cortlandt Manor, N.Y., for petitioners-respondents. Theoni Stamos-Salotto, Hopewell Junction, N.Y., attorney for the children.
In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6 for grandparent visitation, themother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Dutchess County (Forman, J.), datedNovember 18, 2011, which, after a hearing, granted the grandparents' petition forvisitation with the subject children and set a schedule for visitation.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion,without costs or disbursements, and the petition for grandparent visitation is denied.
A court determining a petition for grandparent visitation must undertake a two-partinquiry. First, it must determine whether the grandparent has standing to petition forvisitation rights (see Domestic Relations Law § 72 [1]; Matter of E.S. v P.D., 8 NY3d150, 157 [2007]; Matter ofWaverly v Gibson, 79 AD3d 897, 898-899 [2010]). If the grandparentestablishes standing, the court must then determine whether visitation is in the bestinterest of the subject child (seeMatter of Steinhauser v Haas, 40 AD3d 863, 864 [2007]). In making this seconddetermination, "courts should not lightly intrude on the family relationship against a fitparent's wishes" (see Matter of E.S. v P.D., 8 NY3d at 157). Indeed, it is stronglypresumed that a fit parent's decisions are in the child's best interests (see id.).Inasmuch as the Family Court's ultimate determination depends in large part on itsassessment of the witnesses, that determination should not be set aside if it is supportedby a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Steinhauser v Haas,40 AD3d at 864).
Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that thegrandparents had standing to petition for visitation (see Matter of Gort v Kull, 96 AD3d 842, 843 [2012];cf. Matter of Waverly v Gibson, 79 AD3d at 899). Nonetheless, its determinationto grant the petition was an improvident exercise of discretion, because the recordestablished that visitation with the grandparents was not in the best interests of thesubject children. The record established that the mother's objections to visitation werewell founded. The grandparents engaged in conduct that showed that visitation was notin the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we reverse the order and deny thepetition. Balkin, J.P., Lott, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.