| Matter of Tafari v Evans |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00384 [102 AD3d 1053] |
| January 24, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Injah Tafari, Appellant, v Andrea W.Evans, as Chair of the Division of Parole, Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Feldstein, J.), entered October 26,2012 in Franklin County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denyingpetitioner's request for parole release.
In 1989, petitioner was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree andwas sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 20 years to life. In 2010, following a retrial,petitioner was convicted of assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the thirddegree and criminal mischief in the third degree, and was sentenced to a controllingdeterminate term of four years in prison, to be followed by five years of postreleasesupervision, to run consecutively to the sentence he was then serving. In May 2011, heappeared before the Board of Parole seeking to be released to parole supervision. At theconclusion of the hearing, his request was denied and he was ordered held an additional24 months. After the determination was affirmed on administrative appeal, petitionercommenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging it. Following joinder of issue,Supreme Court dismissed the petition and petitioner now appeals.
It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not bedisturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of ExecutiveLaw § 259-i (see Matterof Vaughn v Evans, 98 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2012]; Matter of Nicoletta v New YorkState Div. of Parole, 74 AD3d 1609, 1609 [2010], lv dismissed 15NY3d 867 [2010]). Here, the record discloses that the Board complied with the statutoryrequirements by considering not only [*2]the seriousnature of petitioner's crimes, but also his criminal history, extensive prison disciplinaryrecord, program participation and postrelease plans (see Matter of Vigliotti v State of N.Y. Exec. Div. of Parole, 98AD3d 789, 790 [2012]; Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054, 1055[2012]). Petitioner claimed in his administrative appeal that the Board erroneously reliedupon disciplinary violations that had been reversed and expunged from his institutionalrecord, but the record discloses that petitioner had numerous disciplinary infractions,notwithstanding the expungement of a few, and the Board's conclusion that he "had apoor record of adjustment while in prison" was well supported. The remainingcontentions raised in petitioner's memoranda to Supreme Court have not been preserved,due to his failure to raise them in his administrative appeal (see Matter of Santos v Evans,81 AD3d 1059, 1060 [2011]; Matter of Nicoletta v New York State Div. ofParole, 74 AD3d at 1610). Therefore, as the Board's decision does not exhibit "'irrationality bordering on impropriety' " (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50NY2d 69, 77 [1980]), we decline to disturb it.
Mercure, J.P., Rose, Stein, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that thejudgment is affirmed, without costs.