Litvinoff v Kaur
2013 NY Slip Op 00462 [102 AD3d 928]
January 30, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 27, 2013


Stanley Litvinoff, Appellant,
v
Amrik Kaur et al.,Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[*1]Werbel, Werbel & Verchick LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Shelly Werbel, GlennVerchick, and Martin Weiser of counsel), for appellant.

Jonathan Silver, Kew Gardens, N.Y., for respondent Amrik Kaur.

Faust Goetz Schenker & Blee LLP, New York, N.Y. (Lisa De Lindsay of counsel),for respondent Patti Construction Corp.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals(1), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, KingsCounty (Bunyan, J.), dated July 13, 2011, as granted that branch of the motion of thedefendant Amrik Kaur which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against her and that branch of the motion of the defendant PattiConstruction Corp. which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofaras asserted against it, and (2) a judgment of the same court dated August 24, 2011,which, upon the order, is in favor of the defendants Amrik Kaur and Patti ConstructionCorp. and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.The notice of appeal from the order is deemed also to be a notice of appeal from thejudgment (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants Amrik Kaur and PattyConstruction Corp.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of directappeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter ofAho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order arebrought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment(see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The defendants Amrik Kaur and Patti Construction Corp., moving separately,established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law bydemonstrating that the plaintiff did not know what caused his decedent to fall on thesidewalk abutting Kaur's premises, [*2]which were underconstruction (see Knudsen vMamaroneck Post No. 90, Dept. of N.Y.—Am. Legion, Inc., 94 AD3d1058 [2012]; Zalot vZieba, 81 AD3d 935 [2011]; Ghany v Hossain, 65 AD3d 517 [2009]; Weinberg v City of New York,3 AD3d 489 [2004]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Accordingly, the SupremeCourt properly granted those branches of the moving defendants' separate motions whichwere for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Roman, JJ., concur.


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