| Matter of Baldwin v Fiala |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00485 [102 AD3d 960] |
| January 30, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Melissa A. Baldwin,Petitioner, v Barbara J. Fiala et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Michael S. Belohlavekand Patrick J. Walsh of counsel), for respondents.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, in effect, to review a determination of theNew York State Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board dated April 26, 2011,confirming a determination of an administrative law judge, which, after a hearing held onDecember 22, 2010, found that the petitioner had refused to submit to a chemical test inviolation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194, and revoked her driver's license.
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and theproceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
Shortly after 11:00 p.m. on October 9, 2010, a Suffolk County police officerresponded to a report of a motor vehicle accident at a specific location in Huntington.Upon arriving at the scene, he observed the petitioner standing in the vicinity of adamaged vehicle. As the petitioner appeared to be injured, the police officer summonedan ambulance, which transported her to the hospital. At approximately 12:30 a.m. onOctober 10, 2010, while at the hospital, the petitioner was arrested for driving whileintoxicated, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192. As the petitionerallegedly refused to submit to a chemical test pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1194 (2) (b), a hearing was conducted before an administrative law judge(hereinafter the ALJ) on December 22, 2010, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1194 (2) (c). After the hearing, the ALJ found that the statutory conditionsmandating administrative revocation of the petitioner's driver's license were met (seeVehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [2] [c]), and revoked her driving privileges.The petitioner appealed to the Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board (hereinafterthe Appeals Board). The Appeals Board confirmed the ALJ's determination. Thereafter,the petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to review the determination.The Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court for disposition (seeCPLR 7804 [g]).
"Appellate review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required[*2]by law is limited to whether that determination issupported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Hughes v New York State Unified Ct. Sys., Off. of Ct.Admin., 78 AD3d 700, 701 [2010]; see Matter of Hildreth v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.Appeals Bd., 83 AD3d 838, 839 [2011]). Substantial evidence consists of "suchrelevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion orultimate fact" (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45NY2d 176, 180 [1978]). While substantial evidence consists of more than a " 'merescintilla of evidence' " (Matterof Miserendino v City of Mount Vernon, 96 AD3d 946, 947 [2012], quotingMatter of Stork Rest. v Boland, 282 NY 256, 273 [1940]) or mere speculation orconjecture, it is less than a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Benjamin vCarrion, 79 AD3d 744 [2010]). Hearsay evidence may form the basis for anadministrative determination (see Matter of Hughes v New York State Unified Ct.Sys., Off. of Ct. Admin., 78 AD3d at 701). "The duty of weighing the evidence andresolving conflicting testimony rests solely upon the administrative agency" (Matterof Wright v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 189 AD2d 767, 768[1993]; see Matter of Hildreth v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. AppealsBd., 83 AD3d at 839). In reaching a determination that a driver has violated aprovision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, an administrative law judge may rely onevidence such as a police officer's testimony (see Matter of Kobel v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. AppealsBd., 85 AD3d 916 [2011]; Matter of Hall v Swartz, 61 AD3d 868 [2009]).
The evidence adduced at the hearing demonstrated that the police had reasonablegrounds to believe that the petitioner had been driving in violation of Vehicle and TrafficLaw § 1192, that the police lawfully arrested the petitioner, that the police gave thepetitioner sufficient warning of the consequences of refusing to submit to a chemical test,and that the petitioner refused to submit to the chemical test (see Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1194 [2] [c]; Matter of Robinson v Swarts, 82 AD3d 986 [2011]).
We reject the petitioner's only contention, which was that the record did not supporta finding that she had been operating the vehicle that was involved in the subjectaccident. The arresting officer testified, inter alia, that upon responding to a report of amotor vehicle accident, he observed the petitioner in an upset and apparently injuredstate, standing on the corner near a damaged vehicle at which point the petitioner statedthat "I was going home and I got hit and my car is messed up." Under thesecircumstances, it was reasonable for the ALJ to infer that the petitioner, prior to standingon the corner, had been driving the vehicle which was involved in the accident.Accordingly, the officer's testimony was sufficient to sustain the ALJ's determination(see Matter of Hildreth v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 83AD3d at 840). Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Chambers and Hall, JJ., concur.