| People v Lloyd-Douglas |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00511 [102 AD3d 986] |
| January 30, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Collin F. Lloyd-Douglas, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Gary Fidel and DonnaAldea of counsel), for respondent. Taylor Prendergrass, Susannah Karlsson, and Christopher Dunn, New York, N.Y.,for New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union,Brennan Center for Justice, New York State Defenders Association, Pre Trial JusticeInstitute, New York Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Five Borough Defense,and Bronx Defenders, amici curiae (one brief filed).
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of Supreme Court, Queens County(Buchter, J.), rendered April 6, 2010, convicting him of attempted murder in the seconddegree, assault in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, andcriminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of thedefendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress a videotaped statement made by himto law enforcement authorities.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, that branch of the defendant'somnibus motion which was to suppress a videotaped statement made by him to lawenforcement authorities is granted, and a new trial is ordered.
The defendant moved to suppress a videotaped statement made by him to an assistantdistrict attorney during the course of an interview conducted prior to the defendant'sarraignment, pursuant to a program instituted by the Queens County District Attorney'soffice. In accordance with that program, a script formulated by the Queens CountyDistrict Attorney's office was read to the defendant prior to administeringMiranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), andobtaining a waiver of the defendant's rights. Because this procedure was not effective tosecure the defendant's fundamental constitutional privilege against self-incrimination andright to counsel, the defendant's videotaped statement should have been suppressed(see People v Dunbar, — AD3d —, 2013 NY Slip Op 00505 [2013][decided herewith]).
Further, this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Other than theimproperly admitted inculpatory statements of the defendant, the People's evidence thatthe defendant committed the acts of which he was accused was limited to the testimonyof the [*2]complainant, the defendant's ex-girlfriend. Thedefendant's confession provided highly probative and damaging evidence against him,and served to corroborate the complainant's testimony. Under these circumstances, theevidence of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, was not overwhelming,and there was a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to thedefendant's conviction (see People v Schaeffer, 56 NY2d 448, 454 [1982];People v Dunbar, — AD3d —, 2013 NY Slip Op 00505 [2013][decided herewith]; People vHarris, 93 AD3d 58, 71 [2012], affd 20 NY3d 912 [2012]).Accordingly, we reverse the conviction, grant that branch of the defendant's omnibusmotion which was to suppress a videotaped statement made by him to law enforcementauthorities, and order a new trial.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remainingcontentions. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Cohen, JJ., concur.