| Matter of Trayvon J. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00692 [103 AD3d 413] |
| February 5, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Trayvon J., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Jacob Gardener of counsel),for presentment agency.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Mary E. Bednar, J.), enteredon or about December 2, 2011, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon afact-finding determination that he committed an act that, if committed by an adult, wouldconstitute the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree, and placed him on probation for aperiod of 18 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The court properly denied appellant's suppression motion. Since the interrogatingdetective made a good faith effort to comply with Family Court Act § 305.2 anddid not willfully or negligently disregard any of its requirements, we find no basis forsuppression of appellant's statements (see Matter of Emilio M., 37 NY2d 173,177 [1975]).
The police notified both appellant's mother and his stepfather that appellant wasbeing taken into custody, and both parents accompanied the officers and their son to theManhattan Child Abuse Unit. However, the detective only permitted one parent to enterthe interview room. As a result, the mother was present for the interview, but thestepfather remained outside.
Family Court Act § 305.2 (3) provides that when a police officer takes a childinto custody, the officer "shall immediately notify the parent or other person legallyresponsible for the child's care, or if such legally responsible person is unavailable theperson with whom the child resides, that the child has been taken into custody." FamilyCourt Act § 305.2 (7) provides that "[a] child shall not be questioned pursuant tothis section unless he and a person required to be notified pursuant to subdivision three ifpresent, have been advised [of the Miranda rights]."
It is plain that subdivision (3) is satisfied when the officer notifies one "parent orother person legally responsible" that their child has been taken into custody. Here thepresence of appellant's mother provided the core protection intended by the statute.
We reject appellant's other claims of noncompliance with Family Court Act §305.2. A child arrestee must be taken to court "unless the officer determines that it isnecessary to question the child" (Family Ct Act § 305.2 [4] [b]). Contrary toappellant's argument, interrogation is not limited to exigent circumstances, and the recordfails to support appellant's claim that he was too tired to be questioned. Finally, while thequestioning did not occur in a "designated juvenile [*2]room" (see Family Ct Act § 305.2 [4] [b]),the setting of the interview satisfied the requirement that the location be "substantiallysimilar" to such a designated room (see Matter of Daniel H., 67 AD3d 527, 528 [1st Dept2009], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 883 [2010]; Matter of Luis N., 112AD2d 86, 88 [1st Dept 1985]).
The court's finding was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against theweight of the evidence (seePeople v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis fordisturbing the court's credibility determinations.
Since we conclude that any error in excluding evidence of the victim's allegedly badreputation for truthfulness was harmless under the circumstances of the case (seePeople v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]), we find it unnecessary to decide whethera group of only four or five relatives can constitute a relevant community under People v Fernandez (17 NY3d70 [2011]) for purposes of introducing reputation evidence.Concur—Friedman, J.P., DeGrasse, Richter and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.