Matter of Marshall v Fischer
2013 NY Slip Op 00920 [103 AD3d 726]
February 13, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 27, 2013


In the Matter of Harold Marshall,Petitioner,
v
Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of the New York State Departmentof Correctional Services, Respondent.

—[*1]

Harold Marshall, Stormville, N.Y., petitioner pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Steven C. Wu and SimonHeller of counsel), for respondent.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of Albert Prack,Director, Special Housing/Inmate Disciplinary Program, on behalf of Brian Fischer, asCommissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, dated May17, 2011, which affirmed a determination of a hearing officer dated March 10, 2011,made after a tier III disciplinary hearing, that the petitioner was guilty of violating prisondisciplinary rule 113.24 (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [14] [xiv]).

Adjudged that the petition is granted, without costs or disbursements, thedetermination is annulled, the respondent is directed to expunge all references to thedetermination from the petitioner's institutional record, and the matter is remitted to therespondent for further proceedings in accordance herewith, if the respondent be soadvised.

The petitioner, an inmate at the Green Haven Correctional Facility, was charged withviolating a prison disciplinary rule which prohibits using a controlled substance(see 7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [14] [xiv]). After a hearing at which the results of aurinalysis test were admitted (see 7 NYCRR 1020.5), the hearing officer foundthe petitioner guilty and imposed sanctions. That determination was affirmed on anadministrative appeal, and the petitioner commenced this proceeding, which has beentransferred to this Court by the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (see CPLR7804 [g]).

"A prison disciplinary determination made as a result of a hearing at which evidencewas taken pursuant to direction by law must be supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Adamson v Barto, 37AD3d 597, 598 [2007]; see CPLR 7803 [4]; Matter of Farooq v Fischer, 99AD3d 709, 711 [2012]; Matter of Vaughn v Orlando, 79 AD3d 1048, 1049[2010]). Substantial evidence "means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind mayaccept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" (300 Gramatan Ave.Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]). "[S]ubstantialevidence 'is less than a preponderance of the evidence' and, as a burden of proof, itdemands only that 'a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the mostprobable' " (Matter of Miller v DeBuono, 90 NY2d 783, 793 [1997] [citationsomitted]). Here, the evidence at the hearing, including, among other things, the hearingtestimony, the results of the urinalysis test, and the request for urinalysis test, providedsubstantial evidence that the petitioner was guilty of violating [*2]the charged prison disciplinary rule (see Matter of Martinez vSelsky, 53 AD3d 989 [2008]; Matter of Mendez v Selsky, 255 AD2d858, 858 [1998]; Matter of Gatson v Selsky, 220 AD2d 906, 907 [1995];Matter of McGill v Coughlin, 182 AD2d 1103, 1103 [1992]; Matter ofNewman v Coughlin, 110 AD2d 981, 983 [1985]). The request for urinalysis testform demonstrated the proper chain of custody (see 7 NYCRR 1020.4 [f];Quartieri v Goord, 251 AD2d 849, 850 [1998]; Matter of Gatson vSelsky, 220 AD2d at 907; Matter of McGill v Coughlin, 182 AD2d at1103-1104).

The determination must be annulled, however, because the petitioner was improperlydeprived of his right to certain relevant documentary evidence, specifically, theinstructions for operation of the testing machine. A prison inmate facing a disciplinaryhearing is not entitled to the same level of due process as a criminal defendant (seeWolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 555-557 [1974]; Matter of Stallone v Fischer,67 AD3d 125, 128 [2009]), but there are minimum standards. A hearing officer'sdenial of a request for a relevant document without an adequate reason requiresannulment of the determination (see Matter of Cowart v Coughlin, 193 AD2d887, 888 [1993]). Here, as the petitioner contends, absent an adequate justification forthe denial of his request (see Matter of Torres v Goord, 261 AD2d 759, 759-760[1999]; Matter of Cowart v Coughlin, 193 AD2d at 888; cf. Matter of Gonzalez vSelsky, 23 AD3d 724, 725 [2005]), he was entitled to the instructions for theoperation of the machine in order to determine if the officer who tested his urinespecimen complied with the regulation requiring that she "precisely follow proceduresrecommended by the manufacturer for the operation of the testing apparatus" (7 NYCRR1020.4 [f] [1] [iii]). Consequently, the petition must be granted, the determinationannulled, all references to the violation expunged from the petitioner's institutionalrecord, and the matter remitted to the respondent for further proceedings consistentherewith, if the respondent be so advised (see Matter of Cowart v Coughlin, 193AD2d at 888).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit, are not properly before us, orneed not be reached in light of our determination. Balkin, J.P., Hall, Austin and Cohen,JJ., concur.


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