| Corchado v 5030 Broadway Props., LLC |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01058 [103 AD3d 768] |
| February 20, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Pedro Corchado, Appellant, v 5030 BroadwayProperties, LLC, et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, and EdisonConstruction Management, LLC, Respondent. V. Barile, Third-PartyDefendant-Respondent. |
—[*1] Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Thomas W.Hyuland, Anastasios P. Tonorezos, and Jeffrey J. Cunningham of counsel), fordefendants/third-party plaintiffs-respondents. Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry, LLP, Hawthorne, N.Y. (Sheryl A. Sanfordof counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Fusco, J.), dated March 15, 2012, whichdenied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of actionalleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondentsappearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when he fell from an A-frameladder while working on the installation of a sprinkler system during the renovation of abuilding. The plaintiff subsequently commenced the instant action to recover damagesfor personal injuries, alleging, inter alia, a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). Theplaintiff then moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on that cause ofaction, and the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion.
"Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and theiragents, a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers fromrisks inherent in elevated work sites" (McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369, 374[2011]; see Norero v 99-105Third Ave. Realty, LLC, 96 AD3d 727, 727-728 [2012]). " 'To impose liabilitypursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1), there must be a violation of the statute and thatviolation must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries' " (Nunez v City of New York,100 AD3d 724, 724 [2012], quoting Tama v Gargiulo Bros., [*2]Inc., 61 AD3d 958, 960 [2009]; see Blake v Neighborhood Hous.Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 287 [2003]). "[W]here a plaintiff's ownactions are the sole proximate cause of the accident, there can be no liability" (Cahill v Triborough Bridge &Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]; see Blake v Neighborhood Hous.Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d at 290).
Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law§ 240 (1) by submitting evidence which demonstrated that he fell from the ladderwhen it "kicked out" from underneath him, and that the failure to provide him with anadequate safety device proximately caused his injuries (see Gordon v Eastern Ry.Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 561-562 [1993]; Robinson v Goldman Sachs Headquarters, LLC, 95 AD3d1096, 1097 [2012]; Reaberv Connequot Cent. School Dist. No. 7, 57 AD3d 640, 641 [2008]; Gilhooly v Dormitory Auth. ofState of N.Y., 51 AD3d 719, 720 [2008]). In opposition, however, thedefendants raised a triable issue of fact as to the manner in which the accident occurred(see Kamolov v BIA Group,LLC, 79 AD3d 1101 [2010]), and whether the plaintiff's own actions were thesole proximate cause of the accident (see Allan v DHL Express [USA], Inc., 99 AD3d 828, 833[2012]; Robinson v Goldman Sachs Headquarters, LLC, 95 AD3d at1097-1098). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation ofLabor Law § 240 (1). Rivera, J.P., Hall, Roman and Miller, JJ., concur.