| Henning v Henning |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01067 [103 AD3d 778] |
| February 20, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Mary E. Henning, Appellant, v Walter Henning etal., Respondents. |
—[*1] Lieb At Law, P.C., Center Moriches, N.Y. (Andrew M. Lieb of counsel), forrespondents Walter Henning, Walter Henning, as Executor of the estate of HildegardHenning, deceased, the Henning Family Trust dated July 21, 1993, the Walter HenningIrrevocable Trust dated May 8, 2002, the Hildegard Henning Irrevocable Trust datedMay 8, 2002, the Walter Henning Irrevocable Trust dated January 17, 2007, and theHildegard Henning Irrevocable Trust dated January 17, 2007. James L. Breen, Farmingdale, N.Y., for respondent Walter H. Henning.
In an action to impose a constructive trust upon certain real property, the plaintiffappeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court,Suffolk County (MacKenzie, J.), entered September 1, 2011, as, upon an order of thesame court dated June 6, 2011, granting the defendants' motion, in effect, pursuant toCPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, made at the closeof the plaintiff's case at a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendants and against herdismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costspayable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
From the time of their marriage in 1985 to the time of their separation in 2009, theplaintiff, Mary E. Henning (hereinafter the wife), and the defendant Walter H. Henning(hereinafter the husband), resided in a home on a parcel of real property located in KingsPark. At the time they took possession, the property was owned by the husband's mother,Hildegard Henning (hereinafter the mother), who died during the pendency of this action.On July 21, 1993, the mother conveyed legal title to the property to the Henning FamilyTrust (hereinafter the family trust). Thereafter, beginning in May 2002, the mother andher husband, Walter Henning (hereinafter the father), as trustees of the family trust,executed several deeds conveying ownership interest in the property to the WalterHenning Irrevocable Trust dated May 8, 2002, the Walter Henning Irrevocable Trustdated January 17, 2007, and the Hildegard Henning Irrevocable Trust dated January 17,2007 (hereinafter collectively the irrevocable trusts).
After the wife and the husband separated, the wife commenced this action to imposea constructive trust on the property, naming as defendants the father individually, thefather as executor of the estate of the mother, the family trust, the irrevocable trusts, andthe husband. The wife alleged, among other things, that the mother and father hadpromised to convey the property [*2]to her and thehusband, that she and the husband had expended significant funds in maintaining andimproving the property in reliance on that promise, and that the defendants would beunjustly enriched if permitted to retain the benefit of her expenditures. The mother andfather acknowledged that they had permitted the wife and the husband to live in thehouse rent free, but insisted that they had never told them that the property would betransferred to them.
At the close of the plaintiff's case at a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court, inter alia,granted the defendants' motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as amatter of law dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court stated, inter alia, that it wasnot convinced that any transfer was intended, that the evidence indicated that theimprovements were undertaken principally for the benefit of the wife, the husband, andtheir children, and that there was no evidence of unjust enrichment, as the money spenton improvements did not approach what the wife would have spent on the purchase,upkeep, and maintenance of her own home. Since the wife failed to meet her burden ofestablishing the elements of a constructive trust, the Supreme Court dismissed thecomplaint. The wife appeals.
" 'A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 may be grantedwhere the trial court determines that, upon the evidence presented, there is no rationalprocess by which the [trier of fact] could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party'" (PAS Tech. Servs., Inc. vMiddle Vil. Healthcare Mgt., LLC, 92 AD3d 742 [2012], quotingC.K. Rehner, Inc. v Arnell Constr. Corp., 303 AD2d 439, 440 [2003]; see Robinson v 211-11 N.,LLC, 46 AD3d 657, 658 [2007]). In considering such a motion, " 'the trial courtmust afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawnfrom the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to thenonmovant' " (Robinson v 211-11 N., LLC, 46 AD3d at 658, quotingSzczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]).
"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy and its purpose is to prevent unjustenrichment" (Marini vLombardo, 79 AD3d 932, 933 [2010] [citation omitted]). To impose aconstructive trust upon real property, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a confidential orfiduciary relationship, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon, and (4) unjustenrichment (see Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121 [1976]; Marini vLombardo, 79 AD3d at 933; Losner v Cashline, L.P., 41 AD3d 789, 790 [2007]). Theseelements, however, serve only as a guideline and a constructive trust may still beimposed even if all four elements are not established (see Marini v Lombardo, 79AD3d at 933; Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233, 241 [1978]).
In this case, giving the wife the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawnfrom the evidence presented, there was a rational basis upon which the Supreme Courtcould have concluded that the first element was satisfied, as it is undisputed that the wifewas related to the husband and the mother and father through marriage, and that themother and father allowed the couple to live on the property for a number of years(see Marini v Lombardo, 79 AD3d at 933-934; Booth v Booth, 178AD2d 712, 713 [1991]). However, even accepting that the wife also satisfied the secondelement by demonstrating that the mother and father implicitly promised to convey theproperty to her and the husband, she failed to satisfy the third element, which requires ashowing that she acted in reliance on the promise. Because the wife had no actual priorinterest in the property, she was required to show that an equitable interest developedthrough the expenditure of time, money, and labor (see Marini v Lombardo, 79AD3d at 934; Washington v Defense, 149 AD2d 697, 698-699 [1989]). The wifefailed to meet this burden, as the evidence adduced at trial indicated that most of theimprovements she undertook on the property over the years were principally made for thebenefit of her, her husband, and their children (see Marini v Lombardo, 79 AD3dat 934; Matter of Lefton [Bedell], 160 AD2d 702, 704 [1990]). In addition, theoperating expenses she paid over the years could be considered rent for use of thepremises, rather than expenditures made in reliance on any alleged promise to conveytitle to the property (see Wilson v La Van, 22 NY2d 131 [1968]; Marini vLombardo, 79 AD3d at 934; Onorato v Lupoli, 135 AD2d 693, 694 [1987]).
With regard to the fourth element, unjust enrichment, the wife, in order to prevail onher claim to impose a constructive trust, had to establish that she conferred a benefitupon the defendants and that the defendants would obtain that benefit without adequatelycompensating her (see Marini v Lombardo, 79 AD3d at 934). "Unjust enrichmentoccurs when in 'equity and good [*3]conscience[,]' aparty obtains or possesses value that rightfully belongs to another party" (id. at934, quoting Parsa v State of New York, 64 NY2d 143, 148 [1984]). Here, as theSupreme Court properly pointed out, there was no evidence indicating that thedefendants were unjustly enriched by the appreciation of the property over the years. Themother and father were seeking to retain their own property and, as noted above, most ofthe improvements undertaken by the wife were principally made for the benefit of her,her husband, and their children. Moreover, even accepting that the property wasimproved, the wife failed to demonstrate that such improvements unjustly enriched thedefendants, given that the mother and father did not seek, and did not receive, anypayments from the wife for her use and possession of the property for nearly 25 years(see Marini v Lombardo, 79 AD3d at 934-935; Broadway Cent. Prop. v 682Tenant Corp., 298 AD2d 253 [2002]; Mente v Wenzel, 178 AD2d 705, 706[1991]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint. Dillon, J.P.,Angiolillo, Leventhal and Sgroi, JJ., concur.