People v Taylor
2013 NY Slip Op 01250 [103 AD3d 867]
February 27, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 27, 2013


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Aaron Taylor, Appellant.

—[*1]

Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Warren S. Landau of counsel), forappellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, EllenC. Abbot, and Danielle S. Fenn of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Aloise, J.), dated January 4, 2011, which, after a hearing, designated him a level threesexually violent offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, andthe matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a new determination inaccordance herewith.

In support of its designation of the defendant as a level three sexually violentoffender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C),the Supreme Court considered a risk assessment instrument (hereinafter the RAI) andcase summary prepared by the New York Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders(hereinafter the Board). The case summary was based upon the Board's review of, interalia, the defendant's inmate file, presentence investigation, and prior criminal history. TheBoard noted that the defendant's prior conviction of a felony sex crime in Florida resultedin an "automatic override" to presumptive risk level three (see Sex OffenderRegistration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at risk factor 9 [3][2006]; see People vReynolds, 68 AD3d 955 [2009]; People v Sanchez, 20 AD3d 693 [2005]). In addition, theBoard assessed points under seven risk factors for an aggregate score of 120 points,placing the defendant in the presumptive risk level three category. At the risk levelassessment hearing, the defendant challenged the automatic override factor and thepoints assessed under several of the risk factors.

On appeal, the defendant correctly contends that the Supreme Court failed to setforth findings of fact and conclusions of law as mandated by Correction Law §168-n (3). While remittal to the Supreme Court is not required where the record issufficient for this Court to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law (see People v Melzer, 89 AD3d1000, 1001 [2011]; Peoplev Vega, 79 AD3d 718, 719 [2010]), we deem the record in this case to beinsufficient for this purpose. The Supreme Court failed to state whether its determinationwas based upon the automatic override or the points assessed in the RAI, and failed tomake findings with respect to the contested risk factors. Moreover, the court failed torecognize a misstatement of the prosecutor to the effect that the court was withoutdiscretion in determining the risk level in light of the automatic override factor. Contraryto the prosecutor's statement, the applicability of an override did not preclude the courtfrom departing [*2]from a level three designation (seePeople v Reynolds, 68 AD3d at 956; People v Sanchez, 20 AD3d at 694).

Under these circumstances, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court,Queens County, for a new determination, at which the court shall indicate on the recordits findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Leventhal and Sgroi,JJ., concur.


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