| People v Lynch |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01288 [103 AD3d 919] |
| February 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Appellant, v Rickey Lynch, Respondent. |
—[*1] Andrew E. MacAskill, Westbury, N.Y., for respondent.
Appeals by the People (1) from an order of the County Court, Nassau County(Berkowitz, J.), dated August 26, 2011, which granted the defendant's motion pursuant toCPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was deprived of his statutoryright to a speedy trial, and (2), as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of thesame court dated March 27, 2012, as, upon reargument, adhered to the originaldetermination.
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated August 26, 2011, is dismissed, as thatorder was superseded by the order dated March 27, 2012, made upon reargument; and itis further,
Ordered that the order dated March 27, 2012, is reversed insofar as appealed from,on the law, upon reargument, the order dated August 26, 2011, is vacated, thedefendant's motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment is denied, theindictment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Nassau County,for further proceedings consistent herewith.
When a defendant stands accused of a felony, the indictment must be dismissedunless the People are ready for trial within six months after the commencement of thecriminal action (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; People v Sinanaj, 291 AD2d 513[2002]). "Whether the People have satisfied this obligation is generally determined bycomputing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and thePeople's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludableunder the terms of the statute" (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992]).
The record does not support a finding that the People's statement of readiness wasillusory or otherwise ineffective, negating excludable periods of delay (see People v Cole, 24 AD3d1021, 1023-1024 [2005]; People v Rodriguez, 306 AD2d 686, 687 [2003];see also People v Fulmer,87 AD3d 1385 [2011]).
With respect to periods of delay that occur following the People's statement of [*2]readiness, only those delays which are attributable to theinaction of the People and directly implicate their ability to proceed with trial are chargedagainst them (see People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 799 [1998]; People vCortes, 80 NY2d at 210), and any period of an adjournment in excess of that actuallyrequested by the People is excluded (see People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d 500, 501[2003]; People v McNeil, 222 AD2d 612 [1995]). Here, the total time chargeableto the People was less than the six-month period of time provided by CPL 30.30 (1) (a).Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant's motion pursuant toCPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment. Mastro, J.P., Angiolillo, Chambers and Cohen, JJ.,concur.