| People v Baker |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01564 [104 AD3d 783] |
| March 13, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Joanne Baker, Appellant. |
—[*1] Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Jennifer Spencer, Steven A.Bender, and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Appeals by the defendant (1) from a judgment of the County Court, WestchesterCounty (Zambelli, J.), rendered November 16, 2010, convicting her of grand larceny inthe third degree and insurance fraud in the third degree, upon her plea of guilty, andimposing sentence; and (2) by permission, from an order of the same court dated July 27,2011, which denied, without a hearing, her motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate thejudgment of conviction rendered November 16, 2010.
Ordered that the judgment and the order are affirmed.
The defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the third degree and insurance fraudin the third degree, arising out of her dishonest and fraudulent billing of an insurancecompany for certain of her dentistry patients.
"A plea of guilty will be upheld as valid if it was entered . . .voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" (People v Bolton, 100 AD3d 1011, 1012 [2012]; seePeople v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]). Here, the defendant's plea ofguilty was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Contrary to the defendant'scontention, she was not coerced into pleading guilty by being forced to choose betweenadmitting guilt and remaining free, or maintaining innocence and going to jail (cf. People v Grant, 61 AD3d177, 183-184 [2009]). The defendant could have maintained her innocence andremained free on bail by choosing to proceed to trial. Under these circumstances, thedefendant's plea of guilty represented a choice freely made by the defendant amonglegitimate alternatives (see People v Hale, 93 NY2d 454, 463 [1999]; People v Alonzo, 90 AD3d1065 [2011]; see also People v Grant, 61 AD3d at 182).
Further, Penal Law § 65.10 (1) vests the trial court with discretion to setconditions of probation that will insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life, orthat will assist the defendant in doing so. The prosecutor's terms of the plea that requiredthat the defendant surrender her dental license, and the court's inclusion of the surrenderas a specific condition of probation, were permissible exercises of prosecutorial andjudicial discretion, respectively (see People v Grant, [*2]61 AD3d at 182; People v Eaddy, 200 AD2d 896,897 [1994]).
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction must be affirmed.
The County Court properly denied, without a hearing, the defendant's motionpursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, as the defendant failed toprovide any nonhearsay evidence to contradict the record (see CPL 440.30 [4][d]; People v Mims, 94AD3d 909 [2012]). Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Leventhal and Sgroi, JJ., concur.