| Matter of Williams v Lloyd Gunther El. Serv., Inc. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01595 [104 AD3d 1013] |
| March 14, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Carlyle Williams, Claimant, vLloyd Gunther Elevator Service, Inc., et al., Appellants. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Iris A. Steel of counsel),for respondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed October5, 2011, which ruled that the employer's workers' compensation carrier may not begintaking a credit against claimant's net recovery from a third-party action until the date onwhich claimant received the recovery.
Claimant established a compensable claim for workers' compensation benefits in2003. Claimant also initiated a personal injury action related to his injuries against a thirdparty. On September 16, 2010, the employer's workers' compensation carrier consentedto a settlement of the third-party action for $35,000. On October 5, 2010, claimantreceived his settlement. Thereafter, the carrier notified the Workers' Compensation Boardthat it had suspended making payments to claimant on October 1, 2010 pursuant to thesettlement and claimed an overpayment of $6,160. Following a hearing, a Workers'Compensation Law Judge found, among other things, that the carrier's credit againstclaimant's third-party recovery commenced on October 5, 2010, the date claimantactually received the settlement. The carrier requested full Board review, [*2]arguing that the credit commencement date should havebeen September 16, 2010, the date the carrier consented to the settlement. Upon review,the Board affirmed the determination and the employer and the carrier now appeal,claiming that the Board failed to follow its own precedent.
In situations such as this, where a workers' compensation carrier consents to aclaimant's recovery in a third-party negligence action, the carrier may be granted a lien onthe proceeds of the recovery equal to the amount of benefits already paid, as well as acredit for any future benefits owed the claimant until the proceeds of the recovery areexhausted (see Workers' Compensation Law § 29 [1], [4]). Although thereis no reference in the statute as to when the credit shall commence (see Workers'Compensation Law § 29 [4]), the Board generally considers the day that a claimantactually collects the recovery as the date upon which a carrier's credit commences(see Employer: Woltmann Assoc., 2012 WL 1371552, *3, 2012 NY Wrk CompLEXIS 02876, *7 [WCB No. 2080 1486, Apr. 12, 2012]; Employer: Hempstead ParkNursing Home, 2011 WL 5128656, *2, 2011 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 06125, *5-6[WCB No. 2921 4308, Oct. 20, 2011]; Employer: Microvisions CCC, 2007 WL1149697, *2, 2007 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 02621, *3-4 [WCB No. 4050 1809, Mar. 16,2007]). The Board has, however, allowed a carrier to begin taking the credit on the datethat it consented to the settlement, provided that its consent letter reflected a clearunderstanding by both parties that no further payments would be made by the carrierunless or until the credit was exhausted (see Employer: Rubbage Constr., 2012WL 2355731, *2, 2012 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 05008, *3-4 [WCB No. 3070 8998, June14, 2012]; Employer: Poughkeepsie Bus. Park LLC, 2007 WL 4953775, *2-3,2007 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 11272, *4-6 [WCB No. 5021 0032, Dec. 24, 2007];Employer: A J M Group, Inc., 2006 WL 1968363, *2, 2006 NY Wrk CompLEXIS 05994, *3-5 [WCB No. 4040 1115, June 30, 2006]; Employer: Collins Bldg.Servs., 2005 WL 401975, *2, 2005 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 11514, *3-5 [WCB No.0012 7923, Feb. 14, 2005]).
Here, the Board did not base its determination upon an assessment of the termsexpressed in the carrier's consent letter. Rather, the Board found that, since the carrierwas not also the carrier that was liable in claimant's third-party action, the carrier couldnot begin taking its credit until the date that claimant received his settlement. In supportof its determination, the Board cited Employer: Icon Routing (2008 WL4602817, 2008 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 09555 [WCB No. 3051 0281, Oct. 1, 2008]). Ourreview of that decision, however, reveals that the cited precedents do not support theBoard's present holding (id.). Rather, in Icon Routing, the Boarddetermined that the workers' compensation carrier in all the cited precedents was thesame and it was entitled to commence its credit on the date of its consent based upon theterms expressed in the consent letter (id.). Significantly, subsequent Boarddecisions have also found that carriers were permitted to take credit for the third-partyrecovery as of the date of consent, based upon the language in the consent letter, with noconsideration as to whether the workers' compensation carrier and the carrier liable in thethird-party action were the same (see Employer: Frame Tech, 2012 WL 6561787[WCB No. 3060 4896, Dec. 5, 2012]; Employer: HDV Concrete, Inc., 2012 WL2476621, 2012 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 05350 [WCB No. G007 1515, June 25, 2012])."While the Board is free to alter a course previously set out in its decisions, it must setforth its reasons for doing so, and the Board's failure to do so renders its decisionarbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Catapano v Jaw, Inc., 73 AD3d 1361, 1362[2010] [citations omitted]). Inasmuch as the Board has not provided a rationalexplanation for departing from its prior precedent in determining when a carrier's creditpursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 29 (4) commences, the decision mustbe reversed and the matter remitted for further proceedings. In light of our holding, theemployer and carrier's remaining contention is academic.[*3]
Mercure, J.P., McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur.Ordered that the decision is reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the Workers'Compensation Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.