| Fonseca v Cronk |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01649 [104 AD3d 1154] |
| March 15, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Miguel A. Fonseca, Respondent, v Denise A. Cronk,Appellant. |
—[*1] Sugarman Law Firm, LLP, Syracuse (Amy M. Vanderlyke of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Donald A.Greenwood, J.), entered March 21, 2012 in a personal injury action. The order denieddefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on thelaw by granting the motion in part and dismissing the complaint, as amplified by the billof particulars, with respect to the permanent loss of use category of serious injury withinthe meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and as modified the order is affirmedwithout costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries heallegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident when the vehicle he was driving wasrear-ended by a vehicle operated by defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injurywithin the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and Supreme Court denied themotion. As plaintiff correctly concedes on appeal, there is no evidence that he sustained aserious injury under the permanent loss of use category set forth in his bill of particulars(see Oberly v Bangs Ambulance, 96 NY2d 295, 299 [2001]). We thereforemodify the order accordingly.
We reject defendant's contention, however, that the court erred in denying her motionwith respect to the remaining categories of serious injury alleged by plaintiff, i.e.,permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use. In support ofher motion, defendant asserted that those limitations were the result of a degenerativecondition in plaintiff's cervical spine and thus were not causally related to the subjectaccident (see generallyPommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572 [2005]). In support of the motion,defendant submitted plaintiff's medical records in which, inter alia, one examiningphysician concluded that plaintiff had a normal range of motion and had suffered from acervical strain or sprain that had resolved, while another examining physician notedsubstantial limitations in plaintiff's rotation and lateral bend that he concluded werecaused by unrelated degenerative changes rather than the subject motor vehicle accident.We thus conclude that defendant met her burden on the motion, "leaving for plaintiff theburden to present objective medical proof of a serious injury causally related to theaccident in order to survive summary dismissal" (id. at 574). In opposition todefendant's motion, [*2]plaintiff submitted the affidavitof his orthopedist, who opined that plaintiff "had a herniated disc at C6-7 whichprotruded to the extent it came in contact with and flattened the spinal cord," which"herniated disc was, . . . to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, causedby the accident of March 5, 2007." "It is well established that 'conflicting expert opinionsmay not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment' " (Pittman v Rickard,295 AD2d 1003, 1004 [2002]; see Williams v Lucianatelli, 259 AD2d 1003,1003 [1999]). Thus, contrary to defendant's contention in support of her motion, plaintiffraised a triable issue of fact whether there was a causal relationship between plaintiff'slimitations and the subject accident. Present—Smith, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley,Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.