| North Shore Towers Apts. Inc. v Three TowersAssoc. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01812 [104 AD3d 825] |
| March 20, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| North Shore Towers Apartments Incorporated,Appellant, v Three Towers Associates, Respondent. |
—[*1] Brody & Browne LLP, New York, N.Y. (Lauren Reiter Brody and Frances K.Browne of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, for declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiff appeals, aslimited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Agate, J.), entered December 19, 2011, as granted those branches of the defendant'smotion which were to dismiss the first, second, and fourth causes of action pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs,and those branches of the defendant's motion which were to dismiss the first, second, andfourth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) are denied.
The complaint alleged that the defendant, Three Towers Associates (hereinafter thesponsor), was the sponsor of an offering plan to convert certain premises (hereinafter thesubject premises) in Floral Park from rental property into cooperative ownership. Thecomplaint further alleged that pursuant to the offering plan, the sponsor issued shares ofthe cooperative which were allocated and made appurtenant to the 1,844 residentialapartments and 2,492 parking spaces of the subject premises. The complaint alleged thatthe offering plan was declared effective in 1986, and that the subject premises wereconveyed to the plaintiff, North Shore Towers Apartments Incorporated (hereinafter thecooperative), a New York housing cooperative corporation.
The complaint alleged that the sponsor was the holder of unsold shares representingthe apartments and parking spaces which were not purchased by tenants during theconversion to cooperative ownership. In addition, the complaint alleged that in March2010, the sponsor sent a letter to the cooperative purporting to surrender cooperativeshares representing 158 unsold parking spaces (hereinafter the unsold parking spaces).The cooperative asserted that the sponsor's purported surrender of the unsold parkingspaces was in violation of, among other things, the offering plan and the proprietaryleases which allegedly governed the rights and responsibilities of the cooperative and itsshareholders. In this regard, the complaint alleged that each of the unsold parking spaceswas appurtenant to a specific proprietary lease for an unsold apartment and that thesponsor could not validly surrender the unsold parking spaces without simultaneouslysurrendering the proprietary leases for the apartments which corresponded to thoseparking spaces.[*2]
The first cause of action asserted in the complaintsought a judgment declaring that the purported surrender of the unsold parking spaceswas null and void. The complaint also asserted, inter alia, a cause of action for amandatory injunction which would require the sponsor to proportionately assign theshares of the unsold parking spaces to the proprietary leases for the unsold apartments(the second cause of action), and a cause of action to recover an attorney's fee pursuant tothe proprietary leases (the fourth cause of action).
The sponsor moved, among other things, to dismiss the first, second, and fourthcauses of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (5) and (7). The Supreme Court grantedthose branches of the sponsor's motion.
A motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1)may be appropriately granted "only where the documentary evidence utterly refutesplaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law"(Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; see Norment v Interfaith Ctr. ofN.Y., 98 AD3d 955, 955-956 [2012]). Here, to the extent that the sponsor'ssubmissions constituted "documentary evidence" within the meaning of CPLR 3211 (a)(1) (see Norment v Interfaith Ctr. of N.Y., 98 AD3d at 955-956; Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73AD3d 78, 86 [2010]; Suchmacher v Manana Grocery, 73 AD3d 1017, 1017[2010]), they failed to utterly refute the cooperative's allegations (see Rabos v R&R Bagels &Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849 [2012]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court shouldhave denied those branches of the sponsor's motion which were to dismiss the first,second, and fourth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1).
The Supreme Court also should have denied those branches of the sponsor's motionwhich were to dismiss the first, second, and fourth causes of action pursuant to CPLR3211 (a) (7). "On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) forfailure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction,accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit ofevery possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within anycognizable legal theory" (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704[2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).
"A motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action prior to the service of an answerpresents for consideration only the issue of whether a cause of action for declaratoryrelief is set forth, not the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to a favorabledeclaration" (Staver Co. v Skrobisch, 144 AD2d 449, 450 [1988]; seeRockland Light & Power Co. v City of New York, 289 NY 45, 51 [1942]; Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v Townof Poughkeepsie, 87 AD3d 1148, 1150 [2011]).
Applying these principles here, we conclude that the allegations in the first cause ofaction presented a justiciable controversy sufficient to invoke the Supreme Court's powerto render a declaratory judgment (see DiGiorgio v 1109-1113 Manhattan Ave. Partners, LLC, 102AD3d 725, 728-729 [2013]; Village of Woodbury v Brach, 99 AD3d 697, 700 [2012];State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.v Anikeyeva, 89 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2011]; see also St. Lawrence Univ. vTrustees of Theol. School of St. Lawrence Univ., 20 NY2d 317, 325 [1967];Rockland Light & Power Co. v City of New York, 289 NY 45, 51 [1942]).Furthermore, the cooperative sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for a mandatoryinjunction (see Marinelli vGabriel & Sciacca, CPA, LLP, 94 AD3d 826 [2012]; Yusin v Saddle Lakes HomeOwners Assn., Inc., 73 AD3d 1168, 1171 [2010]; Elow v Svenningsen, 58 AD3d674, 675 [2009]; cf.Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 77 AD3d 344, 368 [2010], mod on othergrounds 18 NY3d 777 [2010]), and to recover an attorney's fee pursuant to theproprietary leases (see City LineRent A Car, Inc. v Alfess Realty, LLC, 33 AD3d 835, 835-836 [2006]; see also Etzion v Etzion, 62AD3d 646, 652 [2009]).
Finally, to the extent that the Supreme Court granted those branches of the sponsor'smotion which were to dismiss the first, second, and fourth causes of action pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a) (5) as barred by the statute of limitations or laches, such determinationwas error (see generally Brach vHarmony Servs., Inc., 93 AD3d 748, 750 [2012]; Fleetwood Agency, Inc. v VerdeElec. Corp., 85 AD3d 850, 850 [2011]). Mastro, J.P., Austin, Cohen and Miller,JJ., concur.