| People v Boumoussa |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01841 [104 AD3d 863] |
| March 20, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Tony Boumoussa, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Morgan J.Dennehy, and Holly L. Serrette of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Mullen, J.), rendered June 4, 2008, convicting him of harassment in the second degree,after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The People are required to be ready for trial within six months after commencementof a felony criminal action (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; People v Beasley, 69 AD3d741, 742 [2010]). As to periods of delay that occur following the People's statementof readiness, any period of an adjournment in excess of that actually requested by thePeople is excluded (see Peoplev Hernandez, 92 AD3d 802, 803 [2012]; People v Williams, 32 AD3d 403, 404-405 [2006];People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d 500, 501 [2003]; People v Williams, 229AD2d 603, 603-604 [1996]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly excluded thepostreadiness delay between August 8, 2007, and October 24, 2007, in excess of thetwo-week adjournments requested by the People on August 8, 2007, and on September19, 2007 (see People v Hernandez, 92 AD3d at 803; People v Williams,32 AD3d at 404-405; People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d at 501; People vWilliams, 229 AD2d at 603-604). The court also properly excluded the periodbetween November 28, 2007, when the court denied the defendant's motion to dismissthe indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30, and January 9, 2008, the date the court set fortrial. As the total time chargeable to the People was less than the six-month time periodprovided by CPL 30.30 (1) (a), the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant'smotion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support hisconviction of harassment in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review(see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]). In anyevent, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see Peoplev Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling ourresponsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence(see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we are satisfiedthat the verdict of guilt was not [*2]against the weight ofthe evidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]). Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Leventhal and Sgroi, JJ.,concur.