| People v Yusuf |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01865 [104 AD3d 881] |
| March 20, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Aadam Yusuf, Appellant. |
—[*1] Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Douglas Noll and Andrea M.DiGregorio of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Ayres, J.), rendered March 2, 2012, convicting him of robbery in the first degree,robbery in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, and conspiracy in the fourthdegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgement is affirmed.
This criminal proceeding arises from a home invasion robbery in Woodbury onNovember 19, 2010. The defendant, along with five other men, drove to the home in twoseparate vehicles. Once there, four of the men, Randolph Chase, Jose Fuertes, GlenCampbell, and Michael Mohammed, approached the home under the pretense ofdelivering flowers to one of the occupants. When the door to the home opened, the fourmen, two of whom were armed with guns, pushed their way inside, tied up the occupantsof the home with duct tape, and proceeded to gather valuables. The police arrived a shorttime later, and the four men fled the home into the backyard and beyond before they wereultimately apprehended.
While the robbery was taking place, the defendant and another man, GoutamPersaud, remained in the defendant's vehicle a short distance from the home. Neither wasapprehended immediately, but both men were ultimately lured by one of the otherparticipants in the robbery to a darkened parking lot where they were arrested.
The defendant made two written statements to the police, after being advised of andwaiving his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]),wherein he acknowledged that he had driven Persaud and two other people, whom herepresented he did not know, in his vehicle to the home in Woodbury and had waited forthem to return.
The Supreme Court granted the People's application pursuant to People vMolineux (168 NY 264 [1901]) to admit evidence of a statement made by thedefendant to a New York City Police Department (hereinafter NYPD) detective whereinthe defendant admitted that, 11 days prior to the Woodbury home invasion robbery, heand Persaud had picked up and dropped off Glen Campbell and one other person at ahome in Queens, driven down the block, and waited for the men, while [*2]Campbell and the other man burglarized the home. Thedefendant admitted to receiving $1,000 as his "cut" of the proceeds of the Queensburglary. The Queens burglary occurred at the home of another member of the familythat lived in the home in Woodbury. The defendant, Persaud, and Campbell hadparticipated in both the Queens burglary and the Woodbury home invasion robbery. TheSupreme Court held that the defendant's statement to the NYPD detective was admissibleto prove the defendant's criminal intent and knowledge with respect to the Woodburyrobbery.
Evidence of prior uncharged crimes is inadmissible to show that a defendant has acriminal propensity (see People v Molineux, 168 NY at 291; see also Peoplev Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241 [1987]). It may, however, be received if it is probativeof the defendant's commission of the instant crime, such as where it tends to show intent,motive, knowledge, common scheme or plan, or identity of the defendant (see Peoplev Alvino, 71 NY2d at 241; People v Molineux, 168 NY at 293). Even then,such evidence is admissible only if its probative value outweighs the risk of undueprejudice to the defendant (see People v Alvino, 71 NY2d at 242).
Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly permittedthe People to elicit testimony regarding the statement the defendant made to the NYPDdetective, wherein the defendant implicated himself in the Queens burglary, as evidencetending to show the defendant's intent and knowledge with regard to the Woodburyrobbery (see People v Ingram, 71 NY2d 474, 479-480 [1988]; People v Arguinzoni, 48 AD3d1239 [2008]; People v Maxwell, 299 AD2d 370 [2002]). The courtprovidently exercised its discretion in determining that the probative value of theevidence in question outweighed the risk of prejudice to the defendant, and the limitinginstruction given to the jury served to alleviate any prejudice resulting from theadmission of the evidence (seePeople v Holden, 82 AD3d 1007 [2011]). Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Lott,JJ., concur.