National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp. v Push Buffalo (People Unitedfor Sustainable Hous.)
2013 NY Slip Op 01963 [104 AD3d 1307]
March 22, 2013
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 24, 2013


National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation,Appellant-Respondent,
v
PUSH Buffalo (People United for SustainableHousing) et al., Respondents-Appellants.

—[*1]Phillips Lytle LLP, Buffalo (Kenneth A. Manning of counsel), forplaintiff-appellant-respondent.

Duggan & Bentivogli LLP, Williamsville (James J. Duggan of counsel) and Cantor,Dolce & Panepinto, P.C., Buffalo, for defendants-respondents-appellants.

Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Gerald J.Whalen, J.), entered March 2, 2012. The order, among other things, denied in part themotion of defendants to dismiss the amended complaint.

It is hereby ordered that said appeal by plaintiff is unanimously dismissed and theorder is otherwise affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that members ofdefendant, PUSH Buffalo (People United for Sustainable Housing) (hereafter, PUSH), acommunity organization, and defendant Whitney Yax, a member of PUSH, trespassed onplaintiff's property in Williamsville and Buffalo, New York in staging demonstrationsconcerning plaintiff's use of funding it received to assist low-income customers withheating costs and with increasing the energy efficiency of their homes. According todefendants, this action constituted an impermissible Strategic Lawsuit Against PublicParticipation (SLAPP action) in violation of Civil Rights Law § 76-a (1), becauseit hindered defendants' efforts to challenge the use by plaintiff of the funding in question,and defendants sought, inter alia, attorneys' fees in their counterclaims pursuant to CivilRights Law § 70-a (1) (a). Supreme Court granted defendants' motion seeking todismiss the amended complaint (see CPLR 3211 [g]) and for summary judgmentdismissing the amended complaint (see CPLR 3212 [h]) with the exception ofthe trespass claims against PUSH, and granted those parts of plaintiff's cross motion forpartial summary judgment on liability on those trespass claims and for summaryjudgment dismissing the counterclaims (see CPLR 3212 [h]). We affirm.

As a preliminary matter, we conclude that plaintiff is not aggrieved by the order, andwe therefore dismiss plaintiff's appeal (see CPLR 5511; Parochial Bus Sys. vBoard of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 544-545 [1983]). On its appeal,plaintiff challenges only the court's determination that the action falls within the statutorydefinition of a SLAPP action, i.e., that it is [*2]materiallyrelated to PUSH's challenge to plaintiff's application to renew its permit to operate theConservation Intervention Program (CIP) (see Civil Rights Law § 70-a [1][a]). That challenge is relevant only in connection with defendants' counterclaims and, ingranting those parts of plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing thecounterclaims, the court granted plaintiff the full relief it sought with respect to thecounterclaims (see Parochial Bus Sys., 60 NY2d at 545). We may, however,consider plaintiff's contention as an alternative ground for affirmance in connection withdefendants' cross appeal (see id.).

"An 'action involving public petition and participation' is an action . . .for damages that is brought by a public applicant or permittee, and is materially related toany efforts of the defendant to . . . comment on, . . . challengeor oppose such application or permission" (Civil Rights Law § 76-a [1] [a]).Plaintiff alleged that PUSH members trespassed on its private property whenapproximately 50 protesters appeared at plaintiff's headquarters and then, later the sameday, at a customer service center, demanding a meeting with the chief executive officer(CEO) and refusing to leave when requested to do so by plaintiff's employees. ThePUSH members left the respective locations only after the police arrived. The protest byPUSH members was designed to demand a meeting with plaintiff's CEO to challenge itsapplication to the New York State Public Service Commission for a renewal of its permitto operate the CIP. We therefore reject plaintiff's contention that the allegations in thetrespass claims against PUSH do not constitute allegations within the meaning of aSLAPP action, inasmuch as they are indeed materially related to PUSH's challenge toplaintiff's application to renew its CIP permit. Thus, plaintiff's action against PUSH wassubject to "a heightened standard of proof" to avoid dismissal (Guerrero v Carva, 10 AD3d105, 116 [2004]; see CPLR 3211 [g]; 3212 [h]).

Nevertheless, we conclude that the court properly refused to dismiss the claimsagainst PUSH for trespass inasmuch as plaintiff's action has "a substantial basis in factand law" (CPLR 3212 [h]), and we conclude that the court properly granted those partsof plaintiff's cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability on those claims."The elements of a cause of action sounding in trespass are an intentional entry onto theland of another without justification or permission . . . , or a refusal to leaveafter permission has been granted but thereafter withdrawn" (Volunteer Fire Assn. of Tappan,Inc. v County of Rockland, 101 AD3d 853, 855 [2012]). It is well establishedthat trespassing is not a protected First Amendment activity (see Tillman vDistribution Sys. of Am., 224 AD2d 79, 87 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 814[1997], appeal dismissed 89 NY2d 938 [1997]; Latrieste Rest. & Cabaret vVillage of Port Chester, 212 AD2d 668, 668-669 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d837 [1995], lv denied 212 NY2d 838 [1995]). In addition, the court properlygranted those parts of plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing thecounterclaims seeking, inter alia, attorneys' fees pursuant to Civil Rights Law §70-a (1).

Although the amended complaint against defendant Whitney Yax was dismissed inits entirety, we reject her contention that the court abused its discretion in refusing toaward attorneys' fees on her counterclaim pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a (1).That section provides only that such fees may be recovered, and we perceive noabuse of discretion or improvident exercise of discretion in the court's refusal to awardsuch fees in this case (see generally Matter of West Branch Conservation Assn. vPlanning Bd. of Town of Clarkstown, 222 AD2d 513, 515 [1995]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Fahey, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.


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