| Bassett v City of Rye |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02037 [104 AD3d 889] |
| March 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Michael M. Bassett et al., Appellants, v City ofRye, Respondent. |
—[*1] Joseph A. Maria, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Edward A. Frey of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution pursuant to42 USC § 1983, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court,Westchester County (Berliner, J.), dated August 26, 2011, which, upon a jury verdict intheir favor, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was, in effect, pursuantCPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of lawdismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of thedefendant's motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the juryverdict and for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint is denied, theverdict is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, WestchesterCounty, for a determination of the remaining branches of the defendant's motion.
This action arises out of the allegedly unlawful arrest of the plaintiff Michael M.Bassett in 2004. Michael M. Bassett, and his spouse suing derivatively, commenced thisaction against the City of Rye, inter alia, to recover damages for false arrest pursuant to42 USC § 1983. On a prior appeal in this action, this Court affirmed the SupremeCourt's denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint(see Bassett v City of Rye,69 AD3d 667 [2010]).
After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs as to the false arrestcauses of action. The defendant then moved, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to setaside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint or, inthe alternative, to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence andfor a new trial. In support of that branch of its motion which was, in effect, pursuant toCPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law dismissing thecomplaint, the defendant argued that the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated thatthere was probable cause for Michael M. Bassett's arrest, that there was no evidence ofan official policy or custom relating to that arrest, and that the plaintiffs failed to provethat they sustained any damages as a result of the claimed deprivation of Michael M.Bassett's constitutional rights.
In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendant's[*2]motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law dismissing thecomplaint, concluding that there was no evidence to support the jury's finding thatMichael M. Bassett's arrest was the result of an official policy or custom of thedefendant. As a result, the Supreme Court did not consider the defendant's remainingcontentions in support of its motion, including the defendant's assertions that there wasprobable cause for Michael M. Bassett's arrest, and that the jury verdict was contrary tothe weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be held.
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the Supreme Court did not violate the law ofthe case in issuing the order appealed from (see CPLR 4401, 4404 [a]; see also Stroem v Plackis, 96AD3d 1040 [2012]; S.L.Benfica Transp., Inc. v Rainbow Media, Inc., 13 AD3d 348, 349 [2004]).
However, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant's motionwhich was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict and forjudgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint. "A court may set aside a juryverdict as legally insufficient and enter judgment as a matter of law only where 'there issimply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly leadrational [persons] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidencepresented at trial' " (Matter ofState of New York v Derrick B., 68 AD3d 1124, 1126 [2009], quotingCohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]).
The Supreme Court determined that the jury verdict should be set aside on theground that the plaintiffs failed to submit evidence showing that the complained-ofactions stemmed from an official municipal policy or custom. A municipality may not beheld vicariously liable pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 based on a theory of respondeatsuperior (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 691[1978]). However, a plaintiff may prevail on a cause of action to recover damagespursuant to 42 USC § 1983 against a municipality where the plaintiff proves theexistence of "(1) an official policy or custom [on the part of a municipal defendant] that(2) cause[d] the claimant to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right"(Jackson v Police Dept. of City of N.Y., 192 AD2d 641, 642 [1993]). "For acause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to lie against a municipality, the actionthat is alleged to be unconstitutional must 'implement[ ] or execute[ ] a policy statement,ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body'sofficers' " (Pendleton v City ofNew York, 44 AD3d 733, 736 [2007], quoting Monell v New York CityDept. of Social Servs., 436 US at 690), or have occurred pursuant to a practice "sopermanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law"(Pendleton v City of New York, 44 AD3d at 736, quoting Adickes v S. H.Kress & Co., 398 US 144, 168 [1970]).
"A municipal custom or policy can be shown by establishing that an official who is afinal policy maker directly committed or commanded the violation of the plaintiff'srights" (Sonne v Board ofTrustees of Vil. of Suffern, 67 AD3d 192, 204 [2009]; see Fields v Village of SagHarbor, 92 AD3d 718, 719 [2012]). Liability for a violation of 42 USC §1983 may be predicated on "a single act, as long as it is the act of an official authorizedto decide policy in that area" (Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41, 49[1996]; see Amnesty Am. v Town of W. Hartford, 361 F3d 113, 126-127 [2d Cir2004]).
Here, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences by which thejury could have rationally determined that the arrest of Michael M. Bassett resulted fromthe decision of an official policymaker or policymakers of the defendant. Therefore, theSupreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant's motion which was, ineffect, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as amatter of law dismissing the complaint.
Under the circumstances of this case, the matter must be remitted to the SupremeCourt, Westchester County, for a determination of the remaining branches of thedefendant's motion. Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Lott, JJ., concur.