| People v Chandler |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02150 [104 AD3d 618] |
| March 28, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Gregory Chandler, Appellant. |
—[*1] Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Jared Wolkowitz of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Roger S. Hayes, J.), rendered March8, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of criminal possession ofstolen property in the fourth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, toconcurrent terms of two to four years, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant's legal sufficiency claim is unpreserved and we decline to review it in theinterest of justice. As an alternative holding, we reject it on the merits. We also find thatthe verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]).
Defendant asserts that the evidence did not establish that he knowingly possessedstolen property. However, defendant was 10 to 15 feet from a car that had just beenbroken into, and he was carrying two purses that had been taken from the car. Inaddition, he was carrying the purses in a furtive manner, attempting to put one of thebags underneath his jacket.
A "defendant's knowledge that property is stolen may be proven circumstantially, andthe unexplained or falsely explained recent exclusive possession of the fruits of a crimeallows a jury to draw a permissible inference that defendant knew the property wasstolen" (People v Landfair, 191 AD2d 825, 826 [1993], lv denied 81NY2d 1015 [1993]; see also People v Cintron, 95 NY2d 329, 332 [2000]). Therewas no indication that defendant found property that had been stolen by someone else(compare People v Moore, 291 AD2d 336 [2002]), and the jury had amplegrounds to discredit defendant's implausible testimony that he found the bags andintended to return them to their owners.
Although the same evidence would have also supported a larceny conviction, the jurychose to acquit defendant of the larceny counts. We do not find that this affects the stolenproperty convictions (see People v Rayam, 94 NY2d 557 [2000]). We see noreason to engage in [*2]speculation about the jury'sdeliberative process (see e.g.People v Dufrense, 37 AD3d 235 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 984 [2007];People v Williams, 239 AD2d 271 [1st Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d899 [1997]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Acosta, Saxe, Freedman and Feinman, JJ.