| People v Thornton |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02278 [105 AD3d 779] |
| April 3, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Ronald Thornton, Appellant. |
—[*1] Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Grazia DiVincenzo ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County(Hinrichs, J.), rendered April 20, 2010, convicting him of murder in the first degree andconspiracy in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved forappellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484 [2008]). In any event,viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility toconduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunityto view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People vMateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; Peoplev Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we aresatisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]).
The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by the Supreme Court'sadmission of certain evidence relating to his involvement in several fraudulent real estatetransactions is without merit. The victim in this case, an attorney, had represented thedefendant in connection with the subject real estate transactions, and had made restitutionagreements on the defendant's behalf with certain parties involved in the transactions.Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence was admissible to establish thedefendant's motive and to complete the narrative of events surrounding the chargedcrimes (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 [1901]; People v Holden, 82 AD3d1007, 1008 [2011]; People v Pinero, 270 AD2d 212 [2000]).
The defendant's contention that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that thedefendant had invoked his right to remain silent after receiving his Mirandarights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) is unpreserved for appellatereview (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Loaiza, 201 AD2d 587, 587-588[1994]). In any event, while we agree that this testimony was improperly elicited, the[*2]error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, sincethe evidence of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, was overwhelming,and there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to hisconviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]; People vDavis, 223 AD2d 652, 653 [1996]; People v Loaiza, 201 AD2d at 588; cf. People v Polhill, 102 AD3d988, 989 [2013]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80,85 [1982]).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Balkin, J.P., Leventhal,Roman and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.