| People v Woodson |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02282 [105 AD3d 782] |
| April 3, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Appellant, v Lemuel Woodson, Respondent. |
—[*1] Judah Maltz, Kew Gardens, N.Y., for respondent.
Appeal by the People from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, NassauCounty (Ayres, J.), entered January 27, 2012, as, upon reviewing the grand jury minutespursuant to a stipulation in lieu of motions, dismissed counts two and three of theindictment on the ground that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legallyinsufficient.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, counts twoand three of the indictment are reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the SupremeCourt, Nassau County, for further proceedings on the indictment.
"Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate'whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained anduncontradicted—and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of theevidence—would warrant conviction' " (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quotingPeople v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92NY2d 523, 525 [1998]; People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 114 [1986]; People v Warren, 98 AD3d634, 635 [2012]; People vJessup, 90 AD3d 782, 783 [2011]). " 'Legally sufficient evidence' meanscompetent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of anoffense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL 70.10 [1]). " 'In thecontext of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of thecrimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt' " (People v Jessup, 90AD3d at 783, quoting People v Bello, 92 NY2d at 526). "The reviewing court'sinquiry is limited to 'whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flowfrom those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes,' and whether 'theGrand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference.' That other, innocentinferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiencyinquiry 'as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference' "(People v Bello, 92 NY2d at 526 [citation omitted], quoting People vDeegan, 69 NY2d 976, 979 [1987]; see People v Warren, 98 AD3d at 635).
In this case, the defendant allegedly physically attacked the complainant as thecomplainant stood in the doorway of her apartment. Under the second count of theindictment, the defendant was charged with burglary in the first degree pursuant to PenalLaw § 140.30 (2), which provides that "[a] person is guilty of burglary in the firstdegree when he [or she] knowingly enters [*2]or remainsunlawfully in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein, and when, in effectingentry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom, he [or she] or anotherparticipant in the crime . . . [c]auses physical injury to any person who isnot a participant in the crime." Under the third count of the indictment, the defendant wascharged with burglary in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law § 140.25 (2),which provides that "[a] person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when he [orshe] knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crimetherein, and when . . . [t]he building is a dwelling." We disagree with theconclusion of the Supreme Court that the evidence presented to the grand jury, viewed inthe light most favorable to the People, was legally insufficient to establish the element,contained in each of these counts, that the defendant knowingly entered or remainedunlawfully in a dwelling, i.e., the complainant's apartment (see People v King, 61NY2d 550, 554-555 [1984]; People v Jackson, 224 AD2d 547 [1996]; Peoplev Daye, 150 AD2d 481, 481-482 [1989]). Accordingly, we must reverse the orderinsofar as appealed from, reinstate counts two and three of the indictment, charging thedefendant with burglary in the first degree pursuant to Penal Law § 140.30 (2) andburglary in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law § 140.25 (2), respectively,and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings onthe indictment. Dillon, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur.