| Matter of Legal Aid Socy. v New York State Dept. of Corr. &Community Supervision |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02307 [105 AD3d 1120] |
| April 4, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Legal Aid Society, Appellant, v New YorkState Department of Corrections and Community Supervision,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank K. Walsh of counsel), forrespondent.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from that part of a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.),entered October 25, 2011 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, denied petitioner's request for an award of counsel fees and costs.
In April 2010, petitioner made a request to the Division of Parole pursuant to theFreedom of Information Law (see Public Officers Law art 6 [hereinafter FOIL])for documents regarding the Division's compliance with the Americans with DisabilitiesAct (see 42 USC § 12101 et seq.). The Division acknowledged therequest and informed petitioner that a response would be forthcoming in approximately20 days. However, the timely response promised was not received. In July 2010,petitioner inquired concerning the status of the request and, while the Divisionsubsequently disclosed documents, they were not responsive to petitioner's inquiry.Petitioner reiterated its document request and followed up with the Division a number oftimes in the following months, but no further disclosures were made, thus promptingpetitioner to file an administrative appeal in December 2010 specifically requesting thateither responsive documents be produced or that a certification be issued affirming thatthe Division did not have such records or that they could not be found after a diligentsearch (see Public Officers Law § 89 [3]). In February 2011, petitionerfollowed up on its administrative appeal and, when informed by the [*2]Division that it had no record of the appeal, petitionerresubmitted its appeal, the receipt of which the Division acknowledged later that month.When petitioner contacted the Division in March 2011, it was again informed that theDivision had no record of the appeal. Petitioner, therefore, again resubmitted its appeal.
The Division again failed to respond to that administrative appeal, promptingpetitioner to commence this CPLR article 78 proceeding in July 2011 seeking an orderdirecting respondent to respond to its FOIL request as well as counsel fees and costspursuant to Public Officers Law § 89 (4) (c). Accompanying respondent's answerwas an affirmation from counsel to the Board of Parole, who was previously counsel tothe Division before its merger with the Department of Correctional Services (seeL 2011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A), wherein he stated that a diligentsearch had been conducted and no responsive documents had been identified. Findingthe matter moot, Supreme Court dismissed the petition and, concluding that petitionerhad not substantially prevailed in this proceeding, declined to award counsel fees andcosts. Petitioner now appeals from so much of the judgment as denied its request forcounsel fees and costs.
In response to a written request for a record, "an agency must either disclose therecord sought, deny the request and claim a specific exemption to disclosure, or certifythat it does not possess the requested document and that it could not be located after adiligent search" (Matter ofBeechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v Signor, 5 NY3d 435, 440-441 [2005];see Public Officers Law § 89 [3] [a]; Matter of Rattley v New YorkCity Police Dept., 96 NY2d 873, 875 [2001]). Where, as here, "[an] agency fail[s] torespond to a [FOIL] request or appeal within the statutory time," the court may awardcounsel fees and other litigation costs to a litigant who "substantially prevail[s]" in aCPLR article 78 proceeding brought to review the constructive denial of the request(Public Officers Law § 89 [4] [c] [ii], as amended by L 2006, ch 492, § 1; see Matter of New York Civ.Liberties Union v City of Saratoga Springs, 87 AD3d 336, 338 [2011]).
By commencing this proceeding to force respondent to respond to its request, after atortuous history, petitioner finally "received all the information that it requested and towhich it was entitled in response to the underlying FOIL litigation, [and thus] it may besaid to have substantially prevailed within the meaning of Public Officers Law §89 (4) (c)" (Matter of New YorkState Defenders Assn. v New York State Police, 87 AD3d 193, 196 [2011]).The statute provides certain permitted responses from an agency to a proper FOILrequest (see Public Officers Law § 89 [3] [a]; Matter of BeechwoodRestorative Care Ctr. v Signor, 5 NY3d at 440-441), and the counsel fee provisiondoes not distinguish between these responses for purposes of assessing whether a personhas substantially prevailed in a FOIL proceeding (see Public Officers Law§ 89 [4] [c]). The fact that full compliance with the statute was finally achieved inthe form of a certification that the requested record could not be found after a diligentsearch, as opposed to the production of responsive documents, does not preclude apetitioner from being found to have substantially prevailed, for the petitioner received thefull and only response available pursuant to the statute under the circumstances. As wehave emphasized, the counsel fee provision was added in recognition that personsseeking to force an agency to respond to a proper FOIL request "must engage in costlylitigation," and the statute was recently amended "in order to 'create a clear deterrent tounreasonable delays and denials of access [and thereby] encourage every unit ofgovernment to make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of FOIL' "(Matter of New York Civ. Liberties Union v City of Saratoga Springs, 87 AD3dat 338, quoting Senate Introducer Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 492 at 5).Mindful of this goal, petitioner, who doggedly pursued its request for more than a yearand never received a responsive reply to that request or its appeals prior to thecommencement of this proceeding, has been [*3]subjected to the very kinds of "unreasonable delays anddenials of access" which the counsel fee provision seeks to deter (Matter of NewYork Civ. Liberties Union v City of Saratoga Springs, 87 AD3d at 338 [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]). Under the circumstances, we find an award ofcounsel fees and costs to be warranted and remit the matter to Supreme Court todetermine the reasonable amount thereof.
Lahtinen, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified,on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied petitioner's request forcounsel fees and costs; matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings notinconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.