People v Parrales
2013 NY Slip Op 02417 [105 AD3d 871]
April 10, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 29, 2013


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Pedro Parrales, Appellant.

[*1]Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Steven R. Bernhard of counsel), forappellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano,Sharon Y. Brodt, and Matthew J. Sweet of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Holder, J.), rendered May 31, 2011, convicting him of attempted murder in the seconddegree, assault in the first degree (two counts), assault in the second degree (threecounts), endangering the welfare of a child (two counts), and criminal possession of aweapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law and in the exercise of discretion,and a new trial is ordered.

During the second round of voir dire, after questioning of the second group ofprospective jurors was completed and each side had exercised challenges for cause, theSupreme Court asked defense counsel if he wished to exercise any peremptorychallenges, and defense counsel responded, "No." Seconds later, as the court named thefirst three prospective jurors in the group to be assigned seats, defense counselinterrupted, apologizing, and explained that he had intended to exercise a peremptorychallenge against one of the remaining prospective jurors in that group, prospective jurornumber four. Although that prospective juror was not yet assigned a seat and the requestwas made just moments after defense counsel mistakenly accepted all of the remainingprospective jurors in that group, the court denied defense counsel's request to challengethat juror as untimely. Under these circumstances, where there was no discernableinterference or undue delay caused by defense counsel's momentary oversight, theSupreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defense counsel'srequest to challenge the prospective juror (see People v Jabot, 93 AD3d 1079, 1081 [2012]; cf.People v Leakes, 284 AD2d 484 [2001]; People v Isaac, 212 AD2d 635[1995]). Since a trial court's improper denial of a peremptory challenge mandatesautomatic reversal (see People vHecker, 15 NY3d 625, 661 [2010]), we must reverse the conviction and order anew trial (see People v Jabot, 93 AD3d at 1082).

The defendant's remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of ourdetermination. Balkin, J.P., Lott, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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