Dimond v Dimond
2013 NY Slip Op 02532 [105 AD3d 891]
April 17, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 29, 2013


Elizabeth Dimond, Appellant,
v
Robert Dimond,Respondent.

[*1]Eric Dubinsky, Westbury, N.Y., for appellant.

Timothy J. Byrnes, Commack, N.Y., for respondent.

Darelle C. Cairo, Riverhead, N.Y., attorney for the child.

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by herbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Santorelli, J.),dated March 5, 2012, as granted the defendant's motion, in effect, to compel the plaintiffto cooperate with the defendant's purchase of the marital residence.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

"[B]efore some alteration in the marital relationship, courts lack the authority, absentthe consent of the parties, to direct the sale of the marital residence owned by the partiesas tenants by the entirety" (Adamo v Adamo, 18 AD3d 407, 408 [2005]). However,"[o]nce the parties to a matrimonial action have consented to the sale of real propertyowned by the parties as tenants by the entirety, that consent cannot be unilaterallywithdrawn" (Janke v Janke, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 3305, *5 [Sup Ct, NassauCounty 2005]; see e.g. Moran vMoran, 77 AD3d 443, 444 [2010]). Furthermore, "[a] stipulation of settlementin a matrimonial action is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation. . . Where the stipulation is clear and unambiguous on its face, the intent ofthe parties must be gleaned from the four corners of the instrument, and not fromextrinsic evidence" (Perry vPerry, 13 AD3d 508, 508-509 [2004]). The terms thereof "operate as contractualobligations binding on the parties" (Ackermann v Ackermann, 82 AD3d 1020, 1020 [2011]).

Here, the parties entered into a so-ordered stipulation which unambiguously providedthat the marital residence was to be sold. Nothing in the stipulation expressly precludedeither party from buying the marital residence.

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.

Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion, in effect, tocompel the plaintiff to cooperate with the defendant's purchase of the marital residence(see e.g. Markson v Markson, 139 AD2d 705, 706 [1988]). Skelos, J.P.,Leventhal, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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