| Molino v Sagamore |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02551 [105 AD3d 922] |
| April 17, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Catherine L. Molino et al.,Respondents, v Sagamore, Doing Business as Sagamore Resort,Appellant. |
—[*1] Rappaport, Glass, Levine & Zullo, LLP, New York, N.Y. (James L. Forde ofcounsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appealsfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Elliot, J.), dated May 8, 2012,which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 501 and 511 to change the venue of theaction from Queens County to Warren County.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motionpursuant to CPLR 501 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Queens County toWarren County is granted, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Queens County, isdirected to deliver to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Warren County, all papers filed inthe action and certified copies of all minutes and entries (see CPLR 511 [d]).
In July 2011, Catherine L. Molino (hereinafter the injured plaintiff), made areservation to stay as a guest at the defendant resort in Warren County from July 30,2011, to August 6, 2011. Upon arrival on July 30, 2011, and while registering for thestay, the injured plaintiff signed a document entitled "Rental Agreement" containing aprovision stating, in relevant part, that "if there is a claim or dispute that arises out of theuse of the facilities that results in legal action, all issues will be settled by the courts ofthe State of New York, Warren County." On August 2, 2011, the injured plaintiffallegedly tripped and fell on the defendant's property and sustained injuries. In October2011, the injured plaintiff and her husband suing derivatively, commenced this action inthe Supreme Court, Queens County. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motionpursuant to CPLR 501 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Queens County toWarren County.
The Supreme Court erred in determining that the Rental Agreement was anunenforceable contract of adhesion and that enforcement of the forum selection clausecontained therein would be unreasonable and unjust. "A contract of adhesion containsterms that are unfair and nonnegotiable and arises from a disparity of bargaining poweror oppressive tactics" (Matter ofLove'M Sheltering, Inc. v County of Suffolk, 33 AD3d 923, 924 [2006]).However, a form agreement such as the Rental Agreement here is not automatically oneof adhesion because "[s]uch claims are judged by whether the party seeking to enforcethe contract has used high pressure tactics or deceptive language in the contract andwhether there is inequality of bargaining power between the parties" (Sablosky vGordon Co., 73 NY2d 133, 139 [1989]). " 'A contractual forum selection clause isprima facie valid and enforceable unless it is shown by the challenging party to beunreasonable, unjust, in contravention of public policy, invalid due to fraud oroverreaching, or it is shown that a trial in the selected forum would be so gravelydifficult that the challenging party would, for all practical purposes, be deprived of itsday in court' " (KMK SafetyConsulting, LLC v Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc., Inc., 72 AD3d 650, 651 [2010],quoting LSPA Enter., Inc. v Jani-King of N.Y., Inc., 31 AD3d 394, 395 [2006]).
Here, the fact that the Rental Agreement containing the forum selection clause waspresented to the plaintiffs at registration and was not the product of negotiation does notrender it unenforceable (see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v Shute, 499 US 585[1991]; Di Ruocco v Flamingo Beach Hotel & Casino, 163 AD2d 270 [1990]).The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that enforcement of the forum selection clause wouldbe unreasonable or unjust, or would contravene public policy, or that the clause is invalidbecause of fraud or overreaching (see Pratik Apparels, Ltd. v Shintex Apparel Group, Inc., 96AD3d 922, 923 [2012]). They further failed to demonstrate that a trial in the selectedforum of Warren County would, for all practical purposes, deprive them of their day incourt (see KMK Safety Consulting, LLC v Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc., Inc., 72AD3d at 651).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are either without merit or improperly raised forthe first time on appeal.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motionpursuant to CPLR 501 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Queens County toWarren County. Dillon, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur. [Prior CaseHistory: 36 Misc 3d 267.]