| Matter of Molinsky v New York State Dept. of MotorVehs. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02579 [105 AD3d 960] |
| April 17, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Samson Molinsky,Petitioner, v New York State Department of Motor Vehicles,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Michael S. Belohlavekand Laura R. Johnson of counsel), for respondent.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New YorkState Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board, dated December 27, 2010,confirming a determination of an Administrative Law Judge dated June 29, 2010, which,after a hearing, found that the petitioner had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law §1180 (d) (2), and imposed a fine in the sum of $90, plus a surcharge.
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and theproceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the determination that he violated Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1180 (d) (2) by speeding is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Kobel v State of N.Y.Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 85 AD3d 916 [2011]; Matter of Hall v Swartz, 61AD3d 868 [2009]; Matterof Namer v Martinez, 26 AD3d 498 [2006]; Matter of Clarke v Martinez, 14 AD3d 612 [2005]; Matter of Koenigsberg v State ofN.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 8 AD3d 383 [2004]; Matter of Mataragas v New YorkState Dept. of Motor Vehs., 6 AD3d 537, 538 [2004]). The Administrative LawJudge properly relied on the police officer's testimony concerning his visual estimate ofthe speed of the petitioner's vehicle as well as the reading of the radar device in theofficer's vehicle. This testimony was sufficient to sustain the determination that thepetitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (d) (2) (see Matter of Kobelv State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 85 AD3d at 916; Matter ofHall v Swartz, 61 AD3d at 868-869; Matter of Clarke v Martinez, 14 AD3dat 612-613).
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit, or are not properly beforethis Court because they were not raised at the administrative hearing (see Matter ofKlapak v Blum, 65 NY2d 670, 672 [1985]; Matter of Kearney v Village of Cold Spring Zoning Bd. ofAppeals, 83 AD3d 711, 714 [2011]). Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal andHinds-Radix, JJ., concur.