Matter of Davis v Evans
2013 NY Slip Op 02810 [105 AD3d 1305]
April 25, 2013
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 29, 2013


In the Matter of Roy Davis, Appellant, v Andrea W. Evans,as Chair of the Division of Parole, Respondent.

—[*1]Roy Davis, Rome, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kate H. Nepveu of counsel), forrespondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McKeighan, J.), entered August 22,2012 in Washington County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denyingpetitioner's request for parole release.

In 1995, petitioner was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 12 years to lifefollowing his conviction of the crimes of robbery in the first degree and burglary in thefirst degree and to a consecutive prison term of six years to life following his subsequentconviction of the crime of attempted robbery in the second degree. In 2011, petitionerappeared before the Board of Parole seeking to be released to parole supervision. At theconclusion of the hearing, his request was denied and he was ordered held for anadditional 24 months. This determination was affirmed on administrative appeal,prompting petitioner to commence this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Courtdismissed the petition and petitioner now appeals.

Petitioner contends that the Board failed to take into consideration the statutoryfactors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i and placed undue emphasis on hiscriminal history in denying his request for parole release. The record reflects that theBoard properly considered petitioner's criminal history, as well as the nature of hiscrimes, his prison disciplinary record, his institutional accomplishments and hispostrelease plans (see Matter ofFrancis v New York State Div. of Parole, 89 AD3d 1312, 1313 [2011]; Matter of Rodriguez v Evans,82 AD3d 1397, 1398 [2011]). The Board is not required to give each statutory factorequal weight nor articulate every [*2]factor in itsdecision, and the placement of greater emphasis on petitioner's criminal history,including his prior failures to adjust to parole supervision, does not demonstrate"irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. ofParole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see Matter of Francis v New York State Div. ofParole, 89 AD3d at 1313; Matter of Kalwasinski v Paterson, 80 AD3d 1065,1065-1066 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 710 [2011]). Accordingly, we find nobasis to disturb the Board's decision.

Peters, P.J., Mercure, Lahtinen and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.


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