| Matter of Davis v State of New York |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03219 [106 AD3d 1488] |
| May 3, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Tyrone Davis, Appellant, v State of NewYork et al., Respondents. (Appeal No. 1.) |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of counsel), forrespondents-respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (William D. Walsh,A.J.), entered August 12, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article10. The order continued petitioner's commitment to a secure treatment facility.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.
Memorandum: In March 2010 Supreme Court, Bronx County, determined thatpetitioner was a dangerous sex offender in need of civil confinement (see MentalHygiene Law § 10.07 [f]). He is currently confined at the Central New YorkPsychiatric Center in Oneida County. Pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.09(a), in early 2011 the Commissioner of respondent New York State Office of MentalHealth (OMH) provided petitioner with an annual written notice of the right to petitionthe court for discharge, which included a waiver option. Petitioner checked the boxindicating that he did not wish to waive his right to petition for discharge. A psychiatricexaminer for OMH attempted to interview petitioner, but he refused to meet with her.The expert issued a written evaluation, and the Commissioner determined based on thereport that petitioner was still a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement. Theannual notice and waiver form, the Commissioner's written determination, and theexpert's report were forwarded to Supreme Court, Oneida County. The court appointedan independent psychiatric examiner chosen by petitioner's counsel, but petitionerrefused to meet with him as well. That expert indicated that he was unable to prepare areport without having a personal examination. On the day scheduled for the annualreview hearing, petitioner did not appear. The court confirmed with petitioner's counselthat petitioner was waiving the right to a hearing, and the court thereafter issued an orderfinding that petitioner is a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement.
Petitioner first contends that the court erred in denying his motion for a change ofvenue to New York County. Contrary to respondents' contention, petitioner's appeal fromthe final [*2]order brings up for review the nonfinal orderdenying the motion for a change of venue because it "necessarily affects" the final order(CPLR 5501 [a] [1]; see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]; Paul vCooper [appeal No. 2], 100 AD3d 1550, 1552 [2012]).
We agree with respondents, however, that the motion was properly denied becausethe court did not have the authority to change venue in this proceeding seeking dischargeunder Mental Hygiene Law § 10.09. Section 10.09 does not include any provisionfor a change of venue, but section 10.08, which sets forth procedures for article 10proceedings, provides as follows: "At any hearing or trial pursuant to theprovisions of this article, the court may change venue of the trial to any countyfor good cause, which may include considerations relating to the convenience of theparties or witnesses or the condition of the respondent" (§ 10.08 [e] [emphasisadded]). Petitioner contends that venue may be changed for any hearing or trial in anarticle 10 proceeding, whereas respondents contend that venue may be changed only fora trial. We agree with respondents. The statute is not ambiguous, and it "clearly anddistinctly" shows the legislative intent (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes§ 76; see § 94). The legislature made a distinction between the terms"hearing" and "trial" in the first phrase of the statute, but only included "trial" whendiscussing a change of venue. The legislature's omission of the term "hearing" whendiscussing a change of venue does not render the statute ambiguous but, rather, suchomission establishes the legislature's intent to restrict a change of venue to trials only.
Petitioner next contends that the court erred in finding that he waived his right to anannual review hearing. Petitioner contends that, while he waived his right to be present atthe hearing, he did not waive his right to the hearing itself. Mental Hygiene Law §10.09 (d) provides, in relevant part, that the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing as tothe retention of the offender if it appears from the submissions under section 10.09 (c)"that the [offender] has petitioned, or has not affirmatively waived the right to petition,for discharge." Section 10.09 (c) lists the materials that the Commissioner forwards to thecourt, including the notice and waiver form. Here, as noted earlier, petitioner indicatedon the annual notice with waiver form that he did not wish to waive his right to petitionfor discharge. On the date scheduled for the hearing, however, petitioner did not appear,prompting the court to ask petitioner's counsel, "[H]e didn't want to come and hedoesn't want his hearing?" (emphasis added). Counsel responded, "Right." Section10.09 (d) specifically contemplates that an offender may waive the right to petition fordischarge, and we conclude that, through counsel, petitioner waived that right.
We reject petitioner's contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel."[B]ecause [a sex offender] is subject to civil confinement, the standard for determiningwhether effective assistance of counsel was provided in criminal matters is applicablehere" (Matter of State of NewYork v Carter, 100 AD3d 1438, 1439 [2012]). Based on our review of therecord, we conclude that petitioner received meaningful representation (see generallyPeople v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). We have considered petitioner'sremaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit. Present—Scudder,P.J., Smith, Centra, Carni and Sconiers, JJ.