| People v Collins |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03262 [106 AD3d 1544] |
| May 3, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vRoosevelt Collins, Appellant. |
—[*1] William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti,A.J.), rendered February 27, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a juryverdict, of murder in the first degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree and petit larceny(four counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of,inter alia, murder in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]; [b]),defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress statements he madeat a police station. Specifically, defendant contends that the statements should have beensuppressed because he was de facto arrested without probable cause and because thestatements were coerced based, inter alia, on the length of the interrogation. We rejectthose contentions.
We agree with defendant that the actions of the officers at the time they took him intocustody amounted to an arrest (see People v Leon, 23 AD3d 1110, 1111-1112 [2005],lv denied 6 NY3d 755 [2005]; see generally People v Brnja, 50 NY2d366, 372 [1980]). Contrary to defendant's further contention, however, the police had "'information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been. . . committed' by" defendant (People v Shulman, 6 NY3d 1, 25 [2005], certdenied 547 US 1043 [2006], quoting People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423[1985]), and thus had probable cause to arrest him.
With respect to defendant's contention that his statements were coerced, we note atthe outset that, although this Court recently affirmed a judgment of conviction resultingfrom a 49-hour police interrogation on the ground that there was a pronounced break inthe interrogation that dissipated any taint, we nevertheless wrote that "the length of theinterrogation was unparalleled and should in no way be condoned" (People v Guilford, 96 AD3d1375, 1376-1377 [2012]). Here, although the length of the interrogation exceeded60 hours, the suppression court properly suppressed as involuntary all of the statementsdefendant made after he had been in custody for 15 hours. Contrary to defendant'scontention, however, his statements made during the first 15 hours of interrogation werenot involuntary due to police coercion. "To determine voluntariness, courts review all ofthe surrounding circumstances to see whether the defendant's will has been overborne"(People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 413 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946[2004]), and that [*2]15-hour length of time does not byitself render the statements involuntary (see People v McWilliams, 48 AD3d 1266, 1267 [2008],lv denied 10 NY3d 961 [2008]; People v Weeks, 15 AD3d 845, 847 [2005], lv denied4 NY3d 892 [2005]; People v Whorley, 286 AD2d 858, 858-859 [2001],lv denied 97 NY2d 689 [2001]; see generally People v Tarsia, 50 NY2d1, 12-13 [1980]). In view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statementsmade during the 15-hour period, e.g., that defendant was given short breaks, food,drinks, cigarettes and bathroom breaks during that period of interrogation, we concludethat those statements were not rendered involuntary by reason of any alleged coercion bythe police (see People vKirk, 96 AD3d 1354, 1357 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1012 [2013]; People v Ellis, 73 AD3d1433, 1434 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 851 [2010]; People v Sylvester, 15 AD3d934, 935 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 836 [2005]).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, viewing the evidence in light of theelements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), weconclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generallyPeople v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Defendant's guilt "was established bya compelling chain of circumstantial evidence" establishing all of the elements of thecrimes of which he was convicted (People v Brown, 92 AD3d 1216, 1217 [2012], lvdenied 18 NY3d 992 [2012]).
Defendant further contends that the court abused its discretion in refusing to sanctionthe People for their untimely disclosure of a videotape. Contrary to the People'scontention, the record establishes that this issue is preserved for our review; the court"was aware of, and expressly decided, the [issue] raised on appeal" (People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d484, 493 [2008]). Defendant failed to establish, however, that he was surprised orprejudiced by the late disclosure, and thus the court did not abuse its discretion inconcluding that no sanction was warranted (see generally People v Jenkins, 98NY2d 280, 284 [2002]; Peoplev Jacobson, 60 AD3d 1326, 1328 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 916[2009]).
We also reject defendant's contention that the court abused its discretion in refusingto impose a sanction for the "consumption," during DNA testing, of hair found at thecrime scene (see generally People v Kelly, 62 NY2d 516, 520-521 [1984];People v Scott, 235 AD2d 317 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 943 [1997]).In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the police, the "failure to preservepotentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law"(Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58 [1988], reh denied 488 US 1051[1989]; see People v Winchell, 250 AD2d 942, 943 [1998], lv denied 92NY2d 931 [1998]; People v Callendar, 207 AD2d 900, 900-901 [1994], lvdenied 84 NY2d 1029 [1995]). Here, the People established that the samples werenecessarily destroyed as part of routine testing procedures, and thus the court did notabuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a sanction.
Finally, we conclude that the sentence of life without parole for the murderconviction is not unduly harsh or severe (see People v Ojo, 43 AD3d 1367, 1368 [2007], lvdenied 10 NY3d 769 [2008], reconsideration denied 11 NY3d 792 [2008];cf. People v Owens, 78AD3d 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 834 [2011]). Present—Smith,J.P., Peradotto, Lindley, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.