| Sukhraj v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03320 [106 AD3d 809] |
| May 8, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Ganga Sukhraj et al., Appellants, v New York CityHealth and Hospitals Corporation, Respondent. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgowand Elizabeth S. Natrella of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, aslimited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County(O'Donoghue, J.), dated December 12, 2011, as granted that branch of the defendant'smotion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first and third causes of action.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In a medical malpractice action, the requisite elements of proof are a deviation ordeparture from accepted community standards of medical care and evidence that suchdeparture was a proximate cause of injury or damage (see Geffner v North Shore Univ.Hosp., 57 AD3d 839, 842 [2008]; Elliot v Long Is. Home, Ltd., 12 AD3d 481, 482 [2004])."A defendant seeking summary judgment in a medical malpractice action bears theburden of establishing, prima facie, either that there was no deviation or departure fromthe applicable standard of care or that any alleged departure did not proximately causethe plaintiff's injuries (seeSwanson v Raju, 95 AD3d 1105, 1106 [2012]). In opposition, the plaintiff mustdemonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact only as to the elements on which thedefendant has met his or her initial burden" (Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26, 43 [2012], citing Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d18, 23-24 [2011]).
Here, the defendant established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matterof law dismissing the first and third causes of action by submitting two detailed expertaffidavits which demonstrated that there was no departure from accepted communitystandards of care and that, in any event, the defendant's treatment was not the proximatecause of any of the plaintiffs' claimed injuries. In opposition, the plaintiffs' expert did notaddress important elements set forth by the defendant's expert regarding causation(see Swanson v Raju, 95 AD3d at 1106-1107; see also Rivers vBirnbaum, 102 AD3d at 43; Bendel v Rajpal, 101 AD3d 662 [2012]; DiGiaro v Agrawal, 41 AD3d764 [2007]). To the extent causation was addressed, the plaintiffs' expert'saffirmation was conclusory and speculative and, accordingly, was insufficient to raise atriable issue of fact (see Shashiv South Nassau Communities Hosp., 104 AD3d 838 [2013]; Rivers vBirnbaum, 102 AD3d at 31-32; Simmons v [*2]Brooklyn Hosp.Ctr., 74 AD3d 1174 [2010]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant'smotion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first and third causes of action,which alleged medical malpractice and loss of consortium, respectively. Mastro, J.P.,Lott, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur.