| Matter of O'Connor v Ginsberg |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03363 [106 AD3d 1207] |
| May 9, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of John J. O'Connor, Respondent, v BarryGinsberg, in his Capacity as Executive Director of the New York State Commission onPublic Integrity, et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Harris Beach, PLLC, Albany (Joan P. Sullivan of counsel), for respondent.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ceresia Jr., J.), enteredJune 15, 2011 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78,among other things, denied respondents' motion to compel petitioner to comply with asubpoena ad testificandum.
In 2009, respondent Commission on Public Integrity notified petitioner, the thenPresident and Chief Executive Officer of the State University of New York ResearchFoundation, that it had received information indicating that he may have violated PublicOfficers Law § 74 (3) (d), (f) and (h). Specifically, the Commission explained thatit had received information that petitioner had secured employment for Susan Bruno, thedaughter of former State Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno, "for which she was notqualified and for which she did little or no work," and had given her privileges that hedid not confer on the other Research Foundation [*2]employees.[FN1]
During the course of its investigation, the Commission made several attempts tosecure petitioner's sworn testimony on a voluntary basis. When those efforts provedunsuccessful, the Commission issued a subpoena requiring him to appear before it.Thereafter, petitioner and respondents entered into an agreement whereby, in exchangefor the Commission's withdrawal of the subpoena, petitioner would appear voluntarilyfor a sworn interview on a date certain. It was further agreed that petitioner wouldsubsequently be afforded an opportunity to provide an unsworn statement or explanationconcerning the matters under investigation. Notwithstanding this agreement, petitionerdid not appear on the date scheduled.
Just over a week later, the Commission issued a notice of reasonable cause(hereinafter NORC) (see Executive Law § 94 former [12] [b]) alleging thatpetitioner knowingly and intentionally violated Public Officers Law § 74 (3) (d),(f) and (h). Accompanying the NORC was a new subpoena requiring petitioner toprovide testimony. On the return date, petitioner's counsel informed the Commission thatthe subpoena was ineffective and, thus, petitioner would not be appearing to givetestimony.
Petitioner subsequently commenced the instant proceeding against respondentsseeking an order directing them to commence an administrative hearing on the NORC ona fixed date and to appoint an independent hearing officer to preside over the hearing.Respondents opposed the petition and moved for an order compelling petitioner tocomply with the subpoena. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding that petitionerfailed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought. The court also deniedrespondents' motion, concluding that the Commission's power to issue a subpoena islimited to the investigatory period preceding the issuance of the NORC. Respondentsnow appeal.[FN2][FN3][*3]
Executive Law § 94 former (16) (d)empowers the Commission to "[c]onduct any investigation necessary to carry out theprovisions of this section."[FN4]"Pursuant to this power and duty, the [C]ommission may administer oaths oraffirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance and require the production ofany books or records which it may deem relevant or material" (Executive Law § 94former [16] [d]). Despite this broad grant of authority, Supreme Court found that theCommission's investigation—including its power to issue a subpoena forinvestigatory purposes—terminates once it issues a NORC. In reaching thisconclusion, the court relied on the language of 19 NYCRR former 941.3 (a), whichprovides that, "[i]f the [C]ommission, subsequent to an investigation of apossible violation . . . of the Public Officers Law[,] . . .determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, it shallsend a [NORC]" (emphasis added). In Supreme Court's view, the language of theregulation strongly suggests that the drafters of the rule—theCommission—contemplated that a NORC would be issued only at the conclusionof the investigation. But the Commission maintains that the requirement that a NORC beissued "subsequent to an investigation" means only that a NORC must be issuedsubsequent to some investigation into the alleged violation—i.e., aninvestigation that results in a determination that there is reasonable cause to believe that aviolation has occurred—not that one may only be issued at the conclusion ortermination of the investigation. Thus, according to the Commission, it is not abruptlystripped of its broad investigatory powers simply because the threshold evidence it hadobtained caused the issuance of the statutorily required NORC.
The interpretation given to a regulation by the agency which promulgated it and isresponsible for its administration is entitled to deference and should be upheld if notirrational or unreasonable (seeMatter of Transitional Servs. of N.Y. for Long Is., Inc. v New York State Off. of MentalHealth, 13 NY3d 801, 802 [2009]; Samiento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70, 79 [2008]; Matter of Gracie Point CommunityCouncil v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 92 AD3d 123, 128[2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 807 [2012]). Here, the Commission's interpretationdoes not conflict with the plain language of the regulation or Executive Law § 94and can neither be characterized as irrational nor unreasonable. Executive Law §94 former (16) (d) contains no time limitation on the Commission's broad power to"[c]onduct any investigation" to carry out the provisions of the statute. Nor does theregulation at issue—which addresses only when a NORC may be issued and towhom it must be sent—reference the Commission's statutory subpoena power orcontain any language purporting to impose a limitation on that power. We [*4]are hard pressed to read the regulation in a manner thatwould restrict the power expressly vested upon the Commission by the Legislature. "Itwould certainly be unusual, if not impossible, for an administrative agency so to depriveitself of power that the Legislature conferred upon it" (Matter of Dickinson v Daines,15 NY3d 571, 575 [2010]).
Moreover, the statute and implementing regulations, when read as a whole,contemplate ongoing investigatory power on the part of the Commission. For example,Executive Law § 94 former (12) (a) provides that "if the [C]ommission determinesat any stage of the proceeding[ ] that there is no violation or that any potentialconflict of interest violation has been rectified, it shall so advise the individual [subject tothe investigation] and the complainant, if any" (emphasis added). In addition, theregulation immediately following the one at issue here requires the Commission toprovide written notice to the parties when, following the issuance of a NORC, it "electsto go forward with a hearing" on the violations charged therein (19 NYCRR 941.4).These provisions intimate the continuing nature of the Commission's investigatoryfunction and contemplate the possibility that additional information could come to lightafter the issuance of a NORC that would persuade the Commission to change its course.The Commission's interpretation is further supported by the fact that a NORC must beissued upon the threshold determination that there is "reasonable cause" to believe aviolation has occurred (Executive Law § 94 former [12] [b]), while a finaldetermination of guilt must be based on "substantial evidence" establishing the violation(19 NYCRR 941.6). Given these differing burdens of proof, it may well be incumbentupon the Commission to gather additional evidence relevant to its inquiry into thecharged violations subsequent to the issuance of a NORC.
Notably, the Commission's interpretation of its regulation is consistent with theoverall purpose and spirit of Executive Law § 94, which is to "strengthen thepublic's trust and confidence in government through fair and just adjudicatory proceduresthat afford all parties due process protection and fair and just resolution of all matters"(19 NYCRR 941.1; see generally Matter of McCulloch v New York State EthicsCommn., 285 AD2d 236, 240-241 [2001]). Following the issuance of a NORC, theCommission could become aware of other potential witnesses or additional informationrelevant to the possible violations. Thus, construing the regulation to permit theCommission to continue its investigation, despite having issued a NORC, would bestserve the underlying purposes of the statute. Conversely, to interpret the regulation asprecluding investigation into new evidence, based solely on the fact that a NORC hadbeen issued, would clearly impede the truth seeking function of the Commission. For allof these reasons, we conclude that the Commission's investigatory powers, including itspower to issue a subpoena, do not terminate upon the issuance of a NORC.[FN5][*5]
There can be little dispute that much time hastranspired since the Commission commenced this investigation, and we fully agree withthe concurring opinion (Lahtinen, J.) that a hearing on the merits of the charges shouldcommence without further undue delay. Yet, we cannot agree, as that concurrencesuggests, that principles of equity and fundamental fairness warrant the conclusion thatthe time for a prehearing interview has now passed. Petitioner has continually resistedefforts by the Commission to secure his testimony. The Commission sought on multipleoccasions to obtain petitioner's testimony, first by requesting that testimony on avoluntary basis, and then by issuing a subpoena to compel it. As noted, the subpoena wasonly withdrawn after petitioner agreed to voluntarily appear for an interview, anagreement that petitioner thereafter reneged on. In our view, the Commission should notbe hamstrung by petitioner's tactics in this regard. To do so would abridge theCommission's statutory power to conduct an investigation and subpoena witnesses andultimately impede its truth seeking function (see Executive Law § 94former [16] [d]).
Garry, J., concurs.
Egan Jr., J. (concurring). Supreme Court found that respondent Commission onPublic Integrity's power to issue the subject subpoena ended upon the issuance of thenotice of reasonable cause (hereinafter NORC). That conclusion was premised upon thetheory that the Commission's power to issue subpoenas in general is limited to theinvestigatory phase of a particular proceeding, which, according to Supreme Court,terminates upon the issuance of a NORC. I agree that there is no definingmoment—either upon the issuance of a NORC or otherwise—when theCommission's investigatory phase ends. Rather, the issuance of a NORC constitutes adetermination by the Commission that reasonable cause exists to believe that an ethicsviolation has been committed by a state employee. That determination is akin to, say, aprosecutor obtaining an indictment from a grand jury and is nothing more than anallegation—the truth of which will be determined at a later hearing at which bothsides may present their respective cases. As with any criminal or civil matter, the filing ofa charge (in this case, the NORC) does not preclude either side from continuing theirrespective investigations—a practice that is desirable because a party may discovernew evidence, even on the eve of a hearing, that nonetheless is admissible because it aidsin ascertaining the truth. Moreover, as the majority points out, there is nothing in theExecutive Law or the accompanying regulations that indicates that the Commission'spower to issue subpoenas ends upon the issuance of a NORC. Again, as in any otherlitigation matter, witnesses may be reluctant or even unwilling to voluntarily appearbefore the Commission, and all parties—including the Commission and theaffected state employee(s)—retain the right to seek a subpoena to compel suchtestimony.
Ironically, the subpoena in question purports to compel petitioner to appear andtestify at "a hearing before the . . . Commission . . . on the25th day of May, 2011." We know from the record before us that there was no hearingscheduled for May 25, 2011—or any other date for that matter. Indeed, the partiesexpressly litigated the issue of the selection of a hearing date in thisproceeding—[*6]with petitioner urging SupremeCourt to issue an order directing the hearing to commence on June 8, 2011 and theCommission asserting that, while it would set a reasonable hearing date as soon aspossible, the actual selection of a date was within its discretion.[FN*]While I am of the view that the subpoena is procedurally defective because it purports tocompel attendance at a hearing that never existed in the first place, petitioner, as solimited by his brief, now argues that the only issue on this appeal is whether theCommission may compel a post-NORC sworn investigative interview by way of asubpoena. On this narrow issue, I agree with the majority's analysis of the Commission'ssubpoena power and, therefore, concur.
Lahtinen, J. (concurring). While I agree with the concurrence, I write separately tostress the need that this matter proceed without delay to a hearing. In light of theprotracted delays and meandering procedures that have marked this proceeding,principles of equity and fundamental fairness—as well as maintaining integrity ofthe administrative process—require that a hearing be held expeditiously (seeMatter of Louis Harris & Assoc. v deLeon, 84 NY2d 698, 708 [1994] [Bellacosa, J.,concurring] ["Actually and perceptually, the quality of justice and fragile respect for itsadministration suffers seriously when lengthy delays are tolerated"]). RespondentCommission on Public Integrity has been investigating petitioner since January 2009, itsinvestigation has been extensive, the underlying facts do not appear complex, theCommission purported to have sufficient independent proof to issue a notice ofreasonable cause (hereinafter NORC) nearly two years ago, and it officially made publicits accusations at that time (having apparently leaked the information prior thereto).Under the circumstances of this proceeding, the time for a prompt hearing on the meritsis at hand.
Briefly, the Commission's first 15-day letter (see Executive Law § 94former [12] [a]) in January 2009 alleged conduct from a time frame prior to when theCommission had jurisdiction over the State University of New York ResearchFoundation. It took the Commission a year, until January 2010, to correct the error andbring its allegations into a time frame over which it had jurisdiction. In July 2010,Supreme Court (Teresi, J.) ordered that the Commission keep its records sealed. A March2011 subpoena resulted in negotiations and an agreement that petitioner would give asworn statement followed by an unsworn statement, the latter being his "opportunity tobe heard" regarding the alleged conduct (Executive Law § 94 former [12] [a]).These statements were to begin on May 5, 2011.
However, on April 18, 2011, a detailed story appeared in the media namingpetitioner as a target of the investigation, and the source of the article was attributed to aperson participating in the investigation. Thus, the Commission charged withinvestigating ethics was now ostensibly leaking "confidential" information, conductwhich, under the current statute, would be a crime and result in an inspector generalinvestigation (see Executive Law § 94 [9-a] [c]). As a result, petitionerexpressed his legitimate concerns regarding the fairness and integrity of the process in adetailed letter to the Commission. Upon receipt of a rather cavalier response, petitioneropted to withdraw from the negotiated agreement regarding his May 5, 2011 appearance.[*7]
On May 13, 2011, the Commission issued itsNORC. It also issued the disputed subpoena, which, as the other concurrence explains,demanded that petitioner appear at a "hearing," when, in fact, no hearing had beenscheduled. On May 24, 2011, this proceeding ensued. While I agree that the statutoryscheme does not necessarily terminate investigative powers when the NORC is filed, thismatter is—hopefully—sui generis. Ideally, the Legislature should clarifywhether a target of an investigation by the Commission is subject to a prehearingsubpoena after a NORC is issued. Nevertheless, the delays and breaches by theCommission in this matter do not reflect well on it, its goals, or the process. This is not tosuggest that petitioner may not have engaged in the alleged conduct; but, the point is thathe is entitled to an expeditious hearing to attempt to clear his name. The time for anyprocedure that could potentially further delay a hearing on the merits has passed.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing somuch thereof as denied respondents' motion; motion granted; and, as so modified,affirmed. [Prior Case History: 33 Misc 3d 161.]
Footnote 1: A second letter wasissued by the Commission in January 2010, which superceded and replaced the firstletter. The January 2010 letter charged petitioner with the same statutory violations, butclarified that the alleged misconduct related to acts occurring after April 25, 2007, theeffective date of legislation that deemed the Research Foundation to be a "state agency"subject to the provisions of the State Code of Ethics set forth in Public Officers Law§ 74.
Footnote 2: Supreme Courtsubsequently issued an amended judgment from which respondents have not appealed.Inasmuch as the amended judgment does not differ materially from the originaljudgment, we will treat the appeal as taken from both judgments in the interest of judicialeconomy (see CPLR 5520 [c]; Matter of Anesi v Brennan, 75 AD3d 791, 792 [2010]; Matter of Scala v Tefft, 42AD3d 689, 691 n [2007]).
Footnote 3: Pursuant to the PublicIntegrity Reform Act of 2011, the Commission was replaced with the newly formed JointCommission on Public Ethics (L 2011, ch 399 [codified at Executive Law § 94]).The Act provides, among other things, that the Joint Commission on Public Ethics shallassume the functions, duties, powers, obligations and unfinished business of theCommission and that the regulations promulgated by the Commission continue to governmatters over which the Commission had jurisdiction when the regulations were issued(see L 2011, ch 399, §§ 6, 15, 16). As relevant here, the Act furtherprovides that, "upon application to the court, the [J]oint [C]ommission on [P]ublic[E]thics shall be substituted as a party [for the Commission]" (L 2011, ch 399, §19). Deeming respondents' request in their brief to be such an "application," we grant it.
Footnote 4: Although ExecutiveLaw § 94 was amended pursuant to the Public Employee Ethics Reform Act of2007 (L 2007, ch 14), the substance of Executive Law § 94 former (16) (d) is nowcontained in Executive Law § 94 (17) (c).
Footnote 5: As the concurringopinion (Egan, J.) points out, petitioner in his brief has expressly limited the issue on thisappeal to whether the Commission has the power to issue a post-NORC subpoenacompelling his attendance at an investigative interview. Thus, any argument that thesubpoena was ineffective because it purports to compel attendance at a non-existent"hearing," rather than an investigative prehearing interview, has been abandoned (see Matter of Cascino v Judges ofthe Albany County Ct., 95 AD3d 1458, 1460 [2012]; Phoenix Signal & Elec. Corp. vNew York State Thruway Auth., 90 AD3d 1394, 1395 n 1 [2011]; Matter of Trudeau v Cantwell,31 AD3d 844, 845 n 1 [2006]).
Footnote *: Supreme Court agreedwith respondents and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed but thereafter electednot to pursue his cross appeal.