| Adeniran v State of New York |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03441 [106 AD3d 844] |
| May 15, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Caroline Adeniran et al., Appellants, v State ofNew York et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Steven C. Wu and DavidLawrence III of counsel), for respondents.
In a claim, inter alia, to recover damages for retaliatory discharge in violation ofExecutive Law § 296, the claimants appeal from an order of the Court of Claims(Lopez-Summa, J.), dated July 12, 2011, which granted the defendants' motion forsummary judgment dismissing the claim.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The claimant Caroline Adeniran, a former employee of the State of New York, whowas employed as a registered nurse at the defendant Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center(hereinafter Pilgrim), commenced this matter, with her husband suing derivatively,alleging, inter alia, that she was harassed and intimidated by the staff of Pilgrim's mentalhealth department, and that her employment was terminated in retaliation forcomplaining to her supervisors.
Contrary to the claimants' arguments, the Court of Claims properly granted thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim. Pursuant to ExecutiveLaw § 296, it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee because he or sheopposed statutorily forbidden discriminatory practices (see Ruane-Wilkens v Board ofEduc. of City of N.Y., 56 AD3d 648, 649 [2008]). To make a prima facieshowing of retaliation under Executive Law § 296, a claimant is required to showthat (1) the claimant was engaged in protected activity, (2) the claimant's employer wasaware that he or she participated in such activity, (3) the claimant suffered an adverseemployment action based upon his or her activity, and (4) there was a causal connectionbetween the protected activity and the adverse action (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for theBlind, 3 NY3d 295, 313 [2004]; Thide v New York State Dept. of Transp., 27 AD3d 452,454 [2006]). Once this initial showing is made, the burden then shifts to the defendant topresent legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its actions.Assuming the defendant meets this burden, the claimant would then have the obligationto show that the reasons put forth were merely a pretext (see Matter of Murphy vKirkland, 88 AD3d 795, 796 [2011]; Matter of Board of Educ. of New Paltz Cent. School Dist. vDonaldson, 41 AD3d 1138, 1140 [2007]).[*2]
The defendants met their initial burden ofdemonstrating that the claimants could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation(see Ruane-Wilkens v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 56 AD3d at 649; Keooulay v Transcore, Inc., 51AD3d 874, 874-875 [2008]) by showing that the complaints made by CarolineAdeniran to her supervisors did not relate to statutorily forbidden discriminatorypractices, and that she, therefore, had not engaged in protected activity. In opposition, theclaimants did not raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v ProspectHosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Accordingly, the defendants were entitled tosummary judgment dismissing the claimants' retaliation cause of action (see Forrest vJewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 312-313).
Further, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause ofaction alleging harassment, as " 'New York does not recognize a common-law cause ofaction to recover damages for harassment' " (Santoro v Town of Smithtown, 40 AD3d 736, 738 [2007],quoting Daulat v Helms Bros.,Inc., 18 AD3d 802, 803 [2005]; see Edelstein v Farber, 27 AD3d 202, 202 [2006]).
The claimants' remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Dillon, Lott andRoman, JJ., concur.