| County of Suffolk v Givens |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03628 [106 AD3d 943] |
| May 22, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| County of Suffolk, Respondent, v Jamell Givens etal., Appellants, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Dennis M. Brown, County Attorney, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Michael A. Amoroso ofcounsel), for respondent.
In an action for the determination of claims to real property pursuant to RPAPLarticle 15, the defendants Jamell Givens and Hudson City Bancorp, Inc., doing businessas Hudson City Savings Bank appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, SuffolkCounty (Whelan, J.), dated June 23, 2010, which granted the plaintiff's motion for apreliminary injunction enjoining them from leasing the subject property.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, withcosts, and the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish (1) a likelihood ofsuccess on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent granting the preliminary injunction,and (3) a balancing of the equities in the movant's favor (see 306 Rutledge, LLC v City ofNew York, 90 AD3d 1026, 1028 [2011]). The purpose of a preliminaryinjunction is to maintain the status quo and prevent the dissipation of property that couldrender a judgment ineffectual (see Board of Mgrs. of the Britton Condominium v C.H.P.Y. RealtyAssoc., 101 AD3d 917, 918 [2012]; Dixon v Malouf, 61 AD3d 630 [2009]). A movant mustsatisfy each requirement with "clear and convincing evidence" (Apa Sec., Inc. v Apa, 37 AD3d502, 503 [2007]). "The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies withinthe sound discretion of the Supreme Court" (Arcamone-Makinano v Britton Prop., Inc., 83 AD3d 623,625 [2011]; see Blinds &Carpet Gallery, Inc. v E.E.M. Realty, Inc., 82 AD3d 691, 692 [2011]; Rowland v Dushin, 82 AD3d738, 739 [2011]).
Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable injury in theabsence of a preliminary injunction prohibiting the appellants from leasing the subjectpremises. Although the plaintiff alleges that it might be subject to liability in the eventthat a tenant is injured at the premises and brings suit, it failed to show that this potentialharm was imminent and not remote or speculative (see Rowland v Dushin, 82AD3d at 739; Trump on theOcean, LLC v Ash, 81 AD3d 713, 716 [2011]; Family-Friendly Media, Inc. vRecorder Tel. Network, 74 AD3d 738, 739 [2010]; [*2]Golden v Steam Heat, 216 AD2d 440, 442 [1995]).The plaintiff's conclusory assertion that leasing the subject premises would render afuture judgment in its favor ineffectual was also insufficient to establish that it wouldsuffer an irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction were not granted. Accordingly, theSupreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motionfor a preliminary injunction. Dillon, J.P., Chambers, Hall and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.