| Inter-Reco, Inc. v Lake Park 175 Froehlich Farm,LLC |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03637 [106 AD3d 955] |
| May 22, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Inter-Reco, Inc., Respondent, v Lake Park 175Froehlich Farm, LLC, et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Ira Levine, Great Neck, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover the security deposit on a commercial lease, thedefendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Jaeger, J.), entered April 17, 2012, as denied their motion to dismiss the complaintpursuant to CPLR 3211 (a).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs,and the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) isgranted.
The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover a security deposit pursuantto the terms of a commercial lease. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaintpursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (5) on the ground that the action was barred by arelease contained within a stipulation of settlement previously entered into by the partiesin connection with a summary eviction proceeding. The Supreme Court denied thedefendants' motion, and the defendants appeal.
Public policy favors the enforcement of settlements (see Booth v 3669Delaware, 92 NY2d 934, 935 [1998]), and a release is "a jural act of highsignificance without which the settlement of disputes would be rendered all butimpossible" (Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 563 [1969]). Generally, a validrelease constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of therelease (see Centro EmpresarialCempresa S.A. v AmÉrica M�vil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 NY3d 269, 276[2011]; Global Mins. & MetalsCorp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93, 98 [2006]), and should not "be converted into astarting point for renewed litigation" (Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d at 563;see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v AmÉrica MÓvil, S.A.B. deC.V., 17 NY3d at 276).
"[A] release is governed by principles of contract law" (Mangini v McClurg,24 NY2d at 562), and a release "that is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its facemust be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms" (Alvarez v Amicucci, 82 AD3d687, 688 [2011]; see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v AmÉricaMÓvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 NY3d at 276; Booth v 3669 Delaware, 92NY2d at 935; Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d at 563; Farrington v HarlemSav. Bank, 280 NY 1, 4 [1939]; Bank v Lake, 284 AD2d 355, 356 [2001];Sparacio v Sparacio, 283 AD2d 481, 483 [2001]). "Whether or not a writing isambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the courts" (W.W.W. [*2]Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]).
Here, the defendants established that the parties entered into a stipulation ofsettlement in which they "mutually released each other, their respective heirs, personalrepresentatives, successors, and assigns . . . from all claims, demands,actions and causes of actions of every kind and nature whatsoever arising out of thesubject lease." Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the terms of the release clearly andunambiguously encompass this action inasmuch as the plaintiff's claim to the disputedsecurity deposit is contingent upon the terms of the subject lease (see Alvarez vAmicucci, 82 AD3d at 688; Bank v Lake, 284 AD2d at 356; Sparacio vSparacio, 283 AD2d at 483). Accordingly, the release executed by the plaintiffshould be enforced according to its terms, and the Supreme Court should have grantedthe defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action is barred bythe release (see Booth v 3669 Delaware, 92 NY2d at 935). Mastro, J.P.,Leventhal, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.