| Spero v Awasthi Ltd. Partners |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03662 [106 AD3d 988] |
| May 22, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Amal Spero, Appellant, v Awasthi LimitedPartners et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New York, N.Y. (Nicholas P. Hurzeler andGregory S. Katz of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta, J.), dated October 4, 2011,which denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a jury verdict findingthat the defendants were negligent, but that their negligence was not a substantial factorin causing the subject accident, as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a newtrial.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
On June 10, 2008, the plaintiff allegedly was injured at the Drunken Monkey Barand Grill when she fell down after being struck in the back by a closing metal door. Thejury determined that the defendants were negligent in failing to keep the door in areasonably safe condition, but that their negligence was not a substantial factor incausing the plaintiff's fall. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant toCPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for anew trial.
A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unlessthe jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence(see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; Nicastro v Park,113 AD2d 129 [1985]). "A jury's finding that a party was at fault but that such fault wasnot a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of theevidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logicallyimpossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause" (Garrett v Manaser, 8 AD3d616, 617 [2004]; see Das vCostco Wholesale Corp., 98 AD3d 712 [2012]). Here, the jury's verdict that thedefendants were negligent but that their negligence was not a proximate cause of theaccident was not contrary to the weight of the evidence (see Rubin v Pecoraro,141 AD2d 525 [1988]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff'smotion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of theevidence and for a new trial.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are not properly before this Court. Dillon, J.P.,Chambers, Austin and Roman, JJ., concur.