| Bank of N.Y. v Samuels |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03958 [107 AD3d 653] |
| June 5, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Bank of New York, Respondent, v AndreaSamuels, Appellant, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Davidson Fink, LLP, Rochester, N.Y. (Larry T. Powell of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Andrea Samuels appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), entered August 18,2011, which denied, without a hearing, her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 and 317 tovacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court (Nicolai, J.), datedSeptember 24, 2008, upon her default in answering or appearing.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied, without ahearing, that branch of her motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) to vacatethe judgment of foreclosure and sale. The process server's affidavits of serviceconstituted prima facie evidence that the appellant was validly served pursuant to CPLR308 (2) (see US Consults vAPG, Inc., 82 AD3d 753, 753 [2011]; Bank of N.Y. v Segui, 68 AD3d 908, 909 [2009]; Hamlet on Olde Oyster BayHomeowners Assn., Inc. v Ellner, 57 AD3d 732, 732 [2008]; Bankers TrustCo. of Cal. v Tsoukas, 303 AD2d 343, 343-344 [2003]). "Although a defendant'ssworn denial of receipt of service generally rebuts the presumption of proper serviceestablished by the process server's affidavit and necessitates an evidentiary hearing, nohearing is required where the defendant fails to swear to 'specific facts to rebut thestatements in the process server's affidavits' " (Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d 716, 716 [2009] [citationomitted], quoting Simonds v Grobman, 277 AD2d 369, 370 [2000]; see Matter of Romero vRamirez, 100 AD3d 909 [2012]; Indymac Fed. Bank FSB v Quattrochi, 99 AD3d 763[2012]; Tikvah Enters., LLC vNeuman, 80 AD3d 748, 749 [2011]). Since the appellant never denied thespecific facts contained in the process server's affidavit, no hearing was required (see Christiana Bank & Trust Co. vEichler, 94 AD3d 1170, 1170-1171 [2012]; cf. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. v Lam, 93 AD3d 713, 714[2012]; Wells Fargo Bank, NAv Chaplin, 65 AD3d 588, 589 [2009]). Moreover, insofar as the appellantmoved pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate her default, she " 'failed to establish areasonable excuse for [her] default since the only excuse [she] proffered was that [she]was not served with process' " (Reich v Redley, 96 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2012], quoting Stephan B. Gleich & Assoc. vGritsipis, 87 AD3d 216, 221 [2011]).
Similarly, the appellant was not entitled to relief under CPLR 317 since she failed todemonstrate that she did not receive actual notice of the summons and complaint in timeto defend (see Wassertheil vElburg, LLC, 94 AD3d 753, 753 [2012]; 393 Lefferts Partners, LLC v New York Ave. at Lefferts, LLC,68 AD3d 976, 977 [2009]). "The mere denial of receipt of the summons andcomplaint is . . . insufficient 'to establish lack of actual notice for thepurpose of CPLR 317' " (Wassertheil v Elburg, LLC, 94 AD3d at 754, quotingMatter of Rockland Bakery, Inc.v B.M. Baking Co., Inc., 83 AD3d 1080, 1081-1082 [2011]; see Burekhovitch v Tatarchuk,99 AD3d 653 [2012]). Balkin, J.P., Leventhal, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.