| Matter of Karagolian v Walsh |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04004 [107 AD3d 715] |
| June 5, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Bedros Karagolian,Petitioner, v Thomas E. Walsh II, Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Susan Anspach ofcounsel), for respondent.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondentThomas E. Walsh II, an Acting Justice of the Supreme Court, Rockland County, datedJune 25, 2010, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner's application to reinstate hispistol license.
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and theproceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
Penal Law § 400.00 (1), which sets forth the eligibility requirements forobtaining a pistol license, requires, inter alia, that the applicant be of good moralcharacter with no prior convictions of a felony or serious offense, and a person"concerning whom no good cause exists for the denial of the license" (Penal Law §400.00 [1] [g]; see Matter ofVelez v DiBella, 77 AD3d 670, 670 [2010]). " 'The State has a substantial andlegitimate interest and indeed, a grave responsibility, in insuring the safety of the generalpublic from individuals who, by their conduct, have shown themselves to be lacking theessential temperament or character which should be present in one entrusted with adangerous instrument' " (Matterof Moreno v Cacace, 61 AD3d 977, 978 [2009], quoting Matter of Pelose vCounty Ct. of Westchester County, 53 AD2d 645, 645 [1976]; see Matter of Manne v Main,8 AD3d 790, 791 [2004]).
"Where a licensee challenges a determination, made after a hearing, to revoke his orher pistol license," or to deny reinstatement of a permit previously revoked, we reviewonly "whether a rational basis exists for the licensing authority's determination, orwhether the determination is arbitrary or capricious" (Matter of Moreno vCacace, 61 AD3d at 978).
Here, the petitioner's pistol license was suspended based on his arrest on December19, 2008, upon charges of resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration, andharassment, and an arrest in December 2006 for driving while intoxicated. At thehearing, there was testimony elicited that on December 19, 2008, the petitioner lockedhis pregnant wife outside of the house during an ongoing snowstorm. There wasapproximately one foot of snow on the ground, and the petitioner's wife was barefoot andhad no jacket. When the police arrived and attempted to [*2]intervene, the petitioner became physically combative withthe officers. The petitioner attempted to push one of the officers and tried to throw theother into the dining room table, requiring them to call for additional officers to assist.Additional testimony was elicited that the petitioner had been arrested in 2006 for drivingwhile intoxicated. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, this evidence was sufficient toprovide a rational basis for the Supreme Court's determination denying his application toreinstate his pistol license and, as such, the determination was neither arbitrary norcapricious (see id. at 978-979; Matter of Gerard v Czajka, 307 AD2d 633[2003]; Matter of Panaro [County of Westchester], 250 AD2d 616 [1998]).
We note that although the Supreme Court improperly considered matter that wasdehors the record (see Matter of Simpson v Wolansky, 38 NY2d 391, 396[1975]; Matter of Schroeder vScoppetta, 77 AD3d 840, 841 [2010]), that matter has not been considered bythis Court in reaching our determination.
The petitioner's remaining contentions are either without merit, or not properlybefore this Court. Skelos, J.P., Angiolillo, Dickerson and Roman, JJ., concur.