People v Williams
2013 NY Slip Op 04036 [107 AD3d 746]
June 5, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 31, 2013


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Mario Williams, Appellant.

[*1]Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (David G. Lowry of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano,Sharon Y. Brodt, and Matthew Sweet of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Latella, J.), rendered February 16, 2011, convicting him of robbery in the third degree,grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifthdegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

A prospective juror may be challenged for cause on the ground that "[h]e [or she] hasa state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdictbased upon the evidence adduced at the trial" (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]). "[A] prospectivejuror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must beexcused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair andimpartial" (People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419 [2002]; see People vArnold, 96 NY2d 358, 362 [2001]). "Where a prospective juror offers suchassurances, the trial court has discretion to deny the challenge for cause if it determinesthat the juror's promise to be impartial is credible" (People v Johnson, 40 AD3d 1011, 1011-1012 [2007];see People v Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363). Here, although the subject prospectivejuror initially indicated that he had a bias, stating that the case had "come this far, sosomething had to happen for it to come this far," he provided unequivocal assurances thatthe filing of an indictment would not have an impact upon his judgment, that he wouldaccord the defendant "the presumption of innocence to which he is entitled," and would"hold the People to the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Theprospective juror further unequivocally agreed with the proposition that "the fact that(the defendant is) sitting here now means nothing until and unless the People prove hisguilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercisedits discretion in denying the defendant's challenge for cause (see People v Hewitt, 95 AD3d1358, 1358-1359 [2012]; People v Johnson, 40 AD3d 1011 [2007]; People v Rolle, 4 AD3d542 [2004]).

The defendant's challenges to certain of the prosecutor's summation remarks areunpreserved for appellate review, as he did not object to the remarks at issue (seeCPL 470.05 [2]; People v Medina, 53 NY2d 951, 953 [1981]; People v Wright, 90 AD3d679 [2011]). In any event, the challenged [*2]remarks were fair comment on the evidence, permissiblerhetorical comment, or a fair response to defense counsel's summation (see People vWright, 90 AD3d at 679; People v Halm, 81 NY2d 819, 821 [1993];People v Overlee, 236 AD2d 133, 144 [1997]; People v Salaman, 231AD2d 464 [1996]). Eng, P.J., Rivera, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.