| People v Coffey |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04054 [107 AD3d 1047] |
| June 6, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v DavidA. Coffey, Appellant. |
—[*1] Irene C. Graven, Acting District Attorney, Owego, for respondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tioga County (Sgueglia,J.), rendered March 29, 2011, convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crimeof attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
On January 14, 2010, a State Police investigator was investigating a suspectedmethamphetamine laboratory located on State Route 17C in the Town of Tioga, TiogaCounty. While at the scene of the suspected laboratory, he received a phone call from aconfidential informant (hereinafter CI) advising that defendant and another person, withwhom the CI had just been meeting, were on their way to that location. According to theCI, the pair were riding in a brown Chevrolet pickup truck, with rust on the rear fender,and they possessed methamphetamine, Oxycontin and a semi automatic handgun. Theinvestigator informed other members of law enforcement and, shortly thereafter, atrooper observed a truck matching the description given by the CI drive past thedriveway to the laboratory. The trooper pulled the truck over, and the driver anddefendant, a passenger, were both removed. Defendant was taken to a spot in front of thetrooper's vehicle, where he was asked whether he had anything on him that the troopershould be made aware of. In response to this inquiry, defendant admitted to carryingmethamphetamine in a cigarette pack. The trooper patted him down and removed thecigarette pack from defendant's pocket, which contained a plastic baggie and a straw,each containing a powder residue. The trooper then placed defendant in handcuffs, readhim his Miranda rights and put him in the backseat of his patrol car.[*2]
The investigator arrived on the scene shortlythereafter, again advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and asked if defendantunderstood his rights and if he wished to continue to speak with him. After defendantanswered both questions in the affirmative, the investigator asked defendant if he hadanything else on him. Defendant said that he was carrying some pills, but a subsequentsearch of his person turned up nothing. Defendant then informed the investigator that thepills must be in his jacket, which was still inside the pickup truck. The investigator thenwent into the vehicle and located the jacket, which contained Oxycontin pills. While inthe vehicle getting the jacket, the investigator spotted a plastic shopping bag in which hecould see the handle of a handgun. Defendant was thereafter transported to the StatePolice barracks, where he provided a signed written statement admitting the possessionof methamphetamine and Oxycontin pills.
Defendant was later charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and,following County Court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress both the physicalevidence and his oral statements, he ultimately waived his right to a jury trial andproceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts. He was found guilty of attempted criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the third degree and sentenced, as a second felonyoffender, to 5½ years in prison, to be followed by three years of postreleasesupervision, with a recommendation that defendant enter the Comprehensive Alcoholand Substance Abuse Treatment program. Defendant appeals.
We affirm. Defendant challenges the denial of his suppression motion, asserting thatthe police did not have probable cause to justify stopping the vehicle and/or making anarrest. Specifically, defendant argues that the People did not establish that theinformation supplied by the CI satisfied the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test.While "the Aguilar-Spinelli test is used in evaluating whether an informant's tipwas sufficient to provide the police with probable cause for either the issuance ofa search warrant or a warrantless arrest" (People v Porter, 101 AD3d 44, 46 [2012], lvdenied 20 NY3d 1064 [2013]), the police did not need probable cause to make theinitial stop of the vehicle. Rather, the police were required to demonstrate theless-demanding standard of reasonable suspicion that defendant has committed, iscommitting or is about to commit a crime (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210,223 [1976]; People v Porter, 101 AD3d at 46; People v Houghtalen, 89AD3d 1163, 1164 [2011]). Here, the investigator testified that the CI had givenreliable information in the past, resulting in several search warrants and arrests. In fact,the CI had provided information that resulted in the discovery of the methamphetaminelab that was being investigated at the time the investigator received the telephone call.Further, the CI had personally observed defendant and the other individual just prior tothe telephone call and informed the investigator of the criminal activity he had observed,as well as the vehicle in which they had departed and the time that they would arrive atthe location of the lab. In our view, the People demonstrated here that the police had areasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the stop of the vehicle (see Peoplev Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 376 [1983]; People v Eutsay, 287 AD2d 298, 299[2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 704 [2002]; People v Evans, 106 AD2d 527,530-531 [1984]).
We reject defendant's contention that removing him from the vehicle at gunpointconstituted an arrest without probable cause. An investigatory stop will not ripen into anarrest based upon the use of weapons by the police when they have reason to believe thatthe suspects are armed and dangerous, and here the police had been advised thatdefendant and the other individual were armed (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d14, 21 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1018[*3][1980]; People v Mabeus, 68 AD3d 1557, 1560-1561 [2009],lv denied 14 NY3d 842 [2010]; People v Mateo, 122 AD2d 229, 231[1986], lv denied 69 NY2d 952 [1987]; People v Evans, 106 AD2d at531). Defendant's admission to possessing methamphetamine thereafter providedprobable cause for his arrest (see People v Snyder, 200 AD2d 901, 903 [1994])and the search of the vehicle (see People v Blasich, 73 NY2d 673, 678-679[1989]; People v Martin, 50AD3d 1169, 1170 [2008]).
Defendant also argues that he was improperly subjected to custodial interrogationwhen the trooper inquired whether defendant had anything on him that he should beconcerned about, and the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to theinquiry requires that his statements be suppressed. Significantly, however, "thresholdcrime scene inquiries designed to clarify the situation and questions that are purelyinvestigatory in nature do not need to be preceded by Miranda warnings"(People v Mayerhofer, 283 AD2d 672, 674 [2001] [internal quotation marks andcitation omitted]; see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], certdenied 400 US 851 [1970]). Here, the trooper had been advised that the occupants ofthe vehicle were armed, and this initial inquiry of defendant constituted a thresholdquestion aimed at alleviating an immediate threat to his safety. Accordingly, we concludethat Miranda warnings did not need to precede it. This determination disposes ofdefendant's further argument that his statement to the investigator was tainted by thealleged illegality of the trooper's initial questioning (see People v Walker, 267AD2d 778, 780 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 926 [2000]). Finally, we agree withCounty Court that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Mirandarights.
Rose, J.P., Lahtinen and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.