| People v Galvan |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04059 [107 AD3d 1058] |
| June 6, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vAlcibiade Galvan, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Gerald A. Dwyer of counsel), forrespondent.
Lahtinen, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County(Giardino, J.), rendered February 22, 2012, convicting defendant upon his plea of guiltyof the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in thesecond degree in a joint indictment filed against him and his codefendant. In satisfactionof both counts, defendant pleaded guilty to the count charging him pursuant to PenalLaw § 265.03 (3), with the understanding that he would be sentenced to a prisonterm no longer than four years. Thereafter, defendant moved pro se to withdraw his pleabased upon the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel. County Court denied defendant'smotion and sentenced him to a prison term of 3½ years followed by three years ofpostrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
Whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his or her plea rests within thesound discretion of the trial court and, generally, such a motion should not be grantedabsent a showing of innocence, fraud or mistake in the inducement (see People v Arnold, 102AD3d 1061, 1062 [2013]; People v Waters, 80 AD3d 1002, 1003 [2011], lvdenied 16 NY3d 858 [2011]). The record here reflects that, at the time of his plea,defendant fully understood the consequences of his plea (see People v Newcomb, 45AD3d 890, 892 [2007]) and he was aware of the existence of the potential defenseof temporary and lawful possession (see People v Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126, 130[1984]). During the plea colloquy, defendant indicated that he [*2]had not been coerced into entering a guilty plea, that all ofhis questions had been answered by counsel and County Court, and that he was enteringthe plea because he believed it to be in his best interest. Defendant also admitted to factssufficient to establish the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree(see Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Accordingly, we find that defendant's guiltyplea was knowing and voluntary and the court properly denied his motion to withdraw it(see People v Arnold, 102 AD3d at 1062; People v Little, 92 AD3d 1036, 1037 [2012]; People v Royal, 32 AD3d1081, 1082 [2006]). Additionally, based upon the record before us, it is apparentthat defense counsel discussed potential defenses with defendant, sought appropriatepretrial hearings and secured a favorable plea bargain. Thus, we find that defendant wasafforded meaningful representation (see People v Royal, 32 AD3d at 1082; People v Stone, 9 AD3d498, 499 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 712 [2004]; People v Henning, 2 AD3d979, 980 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 740 [2004]).
Peters, P.J., Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.